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1
Introduction
A NEW NAME AND A CHANGING EMPHASIS FOR
FOOD ASSISTANCE
The Food Stamp Program formally passed into history on October
1, 2008, when it was rechristened the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP). In the previous four decades, the Food Stamp
Program reliably and unceremoniously helped millions of low-income
individuals and families in the United States obtain more nutritious
diets than they could otherwise afford. The program has been a vital
strand in an otherwise fraying U.S. social safety net, retaining its basic
structure during the welfare reform of the 1990s, and even expanding
during the first decade of the 2000s.1
A renaming may have been overdue, given some of the changes
in the Food Stamp Program. First, the program altered the way that it
issues benefits. Since 2004, when the last of the states implemented
its Electronic Benefit Transfer (EBT) system, monthly food assistance
benefits have been credited to plastic debit cards rather than being distributed as coupons. So, “food stamps” themselves have become a thing
of the past. Second, the federal and state governments have become
more interested in leveraging the available food assistance into better nutritional outcomes and healthier lifestyles for disadvantaged
families—that is, addressing problems beyond a simple lack of food.
Third, beginning with the welfare reform of the 1990s, the program
has increasingly emphasized self-sufficiency, with benefits that were
expected to supplement the economic resources that people could contribute themselves. The program has adopted several methods to promote self-sufficiency, including easing income reporting requirements,
offering employment and training services, and even mandating work
for some recipients. Despite these major changes, the food stamps name
has remained in popular use, presumably a reflection of the positive
image of the program.2
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This third area—the relationship between food assistance and economic self-sufficiency—is the focus of this book. Within this area, we
are keenly interested in how food assistance serves and sometimes fails
to serve the working poor through its rules and administrative practices.
We will be the first to admit that program rules and administration
are an unglamorous, if not dowdy, topic; we are not holding our breath
waiting for Hollywood to turn our book into a movie script. However,
as several of us have discovered in our research, the relatively mundane
rules that are the book’s central characters play surprisingly large roles
in people’s program experiences and participation behavior. We hope to
shine a light on some of these rules and practices.
Our book marshals evidence from three states—Georgia, Missouri,
and South Carolina—where we were able to obtain detailed administrative records about households and their members from electronic case
management systems and other databases. The book investigates the
relationship between different program rules, program participation,
and work from October 1, 2000 (the start of the 2001 federal fiscal year)
to September 30, 2007 (the end of the 2007 fiscal year). Thus, the analysis covers a period that extends back two years prior to the enactment
of the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 (the 2002 Farm
Bill) and forward five years after that legislation to just before the start
of the Great Recession. The passage of the 2002 Farm Bill, as we subsequently discuss, was an important event because of the flexibility that
it granted states in administering the Food Stamp Program to address
issues associated with the working poor. As the main analysis focuses
on the era before the program’s name change, we generally refer to it
as the Food Stamp Program, although our discussion of the program in
the recent period often uses SNAP. The issues we raise remain highly
relevant for the current program, which, in terms of basic structure, has
changed relatively little since the period of our analysis.
In the remainder of this chapter, we begin by providing general background on the Food Stamp Program. We discuss the rules that define it
as a means-tested entitlement serving as one of the main pillars of the
U.S. safety net. We then turn to a discussion of the trends in the recent
food stamp caseload and the incidence of paid work among recipients.
The evidence suggests that substantial numbers of households that are
eligible for food stamp benefits do not receive them, and that the extent
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to which eligible individuals enroll is influenced by the states’ administration of the program. We highlight two elements of importance: procedures for certifying potential recipients and recertifying recipients,
and policies for treatment of able-bodied adults without dependents.
These will be the primary focus of our analyses in the book.

GENERAL BACKGROUND ON THE FOOD
STAMP PROGRAM
To start our examination, it is useful to review the structure of the
Food Stamp Program, which operates throughout the United States. The
program accounts for the lion’s share of government food assistance
expenditures. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) spent $54.3
billion for food assistance in fiscal year (FY) 2007. Of that total, $33
billion, or 61 percent, went to the Food Stamp Program (Oliveira 2008).
The program served an average of 11.8 million households with 26.5
million people per month in 2007, providing participants with an average monthly per-person benefit of $96. The next most expensive food
assistance program was the National School Lunch Program, which
cost the federal government $8.7 billion but served more than 30.6
million children on a daily basis. Among the other large programs, the
USDA spent $2.2 billion on the School Breakfast Program; $5.5 billion
on the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants and
Children; and $2.2 billion on the Child and Adult Care Food Program.
We can also compare the Food Stamp Program to other major lowincome assistance programs. The total amount spent on food stamp
benefits far surpasses the amount spent on benefits for the Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program. In FY 2009, the federal
and state governments spent $11 billion on cash assistance for TANF
($31 billion if supportive expenditures are included), which served an
average of 4.0 million people per month (Office of Family Assistance
2012). However, food stamp spending was dwarfed by the $316 billion
that was spent on Medicaid in FY 2007 (U.S. Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services 2008). Over the past decade, SNAP has grown
in importance. By 2012, the SNAP budget had swollen to over $89
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billion (including funds allocated by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act), although the allocation declined to under $80 billion by
2017, as a result of the economic recovery (USDA 2013, 2017).
From a public finance and public administration perspective, the
Food Stamp Program has operated as a federal/state partnership. In this
arrangement, the federal government pays the full cost of benefits, covers half of the states’ administrative expenses, and sets many of the
overarching program rules, including the financial formulas for eligibility and benefits. The states, in turn, are responsible for administering the program on a day-to-day basis. The states receive and process
applications for assistance, determine applicants’ eligibility, operate
and distribute benefits through their EBT systems, reassess participants’ eligibility and benefits, and provide other services, such as outreach, nutritional education, and employment and training services. The
states have considerable latitude in the way that they administer their
programs.
The Food Stamp Program is a means-tested entitlement program.
Means-tested signifies both that eligibility is restricted to households
with few financial resources and that the assistance that eligible households can receive is reduced as their incomes increase. Entitlement indicates that spending in the program is not capped and that all eligible
households can receive benefits. This may seem to be a minor point, but
it contrasts with the structure of some other programs, such as TANF, in
which federal spending is provided through lump-sum block grants to
the states. If the states exhaust their TANF grants, they can turn eligible
needy families away.3
Means-testing in the Food Stamp Program is generally accomplished through three specific criteria: a gross-income test, a net-income
test, and an asset test. To pass the gross income test in the contiguous
United States, a nonelderly household’s total monthly pretax income
from all sources, including other transfer payments, must be less than
130 percent of the government’s monthly poverty threshold for that
household’s size. In FY 2007, the applicable monthly threshold for a
four-person household was $2,167.4
Households must also satisfy a net-income test. The net income,
which is also used in the benefit calculation, accounts for several potential and actual expenses in the household. For general expenses, the
net income formula includes a standard deduction that varies modestly
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with household size; in FY 2007, the standard deduction for a fourperson household was $139. To account for work expenses, 20 percent of a household’s earnings are also excluded from net income. The
net income formula additionally excludes child care expenses, housing (shelter) costs over a threshold, and excess medical expenses (for
those disabled or aged 60 or older) and adjusts for utility costs. Once
these adjustments are made, a household’s monthly net income must be
below the relevant poverty threshold to receive benefits. In FY 2007,
the threshold for a household of four was $1,667.
Finally, at the time of our analysis, a household’s countable assets
had to be less than $2,000 if the household had no elderly members
(no members aged 60 or older) or $3,000 if the household had one or
more elderly members. However, an increasing number of states have
eliminated asset restrictions. By 2007, 7 states had done so, increasing
to 35 states by 2013.5 Asset limits have also increased slightly since the
time of our analysis.
Households can qualify for food stamps under some other circumstances. For example, households are categorically eligible for food
stamps if all the members already receive benefits from TANF, Supplemental Security Income (SSI), or General Assistance programs. Households that are categorically eligible must meet the income and asset
tests of those other programs but not those of the Food Stamp Program.
In addition to categorical eligibility, some states offer food stamps as
short-term transitional assistance to families with members who have
left the TANF rolls for work; these families might not be financially eligible at the time of the transitional benefit but would have been earlier.
Food stamps are also sometimes provided under emergency circumstances, such as natural disasters.
If a household is eligible for the Food Stamp Program, its benefits
are calculated by taking a maximum benefit allotment, which varies
by household size, and subtracting 30 percent of the household’s net
income. In FY 2007, the maximum monthly allotment for a household with four people was $588. There is also a minimum benefit, so
all households that are eligible can potentially receive some positive
amount of assistance. For the period that we consider, the minimum
benefit for households with one or two people was $10.
To see how the benefit and eligibility formulas work, consider a
hypothetical four-person family in 2007 whose only income came from

6 Mueser, Ribar, and Tekin

a single earner who worked 40 hours per week at an hourly wage of
$10. Also, assume that the family had no assets. On average there are
4.33 weeks in a month, so the family’s prospective pretax gross income
would have been $1,732 (= $10/hour × 40 hours × 4.33 weeks). This
amount is slightly above the poverty threshold but below 130 percent
of the threshold, so the household passes the gross-income test. If the
family had no other special expenses (e.g., its shelter costs were less
than half of its adjusted income), the family would take a work expense
deduction of $346 (= 0.2 × $1,732) and a standard deduction of $139,
leaving a net income of $1,247, which is below the net-income threshold. The household passes both income tests and has no assets to consider, so it is eligible to participate in the Food Stamp Program. The
household’s monthly food stamp benefit would have been $214 (= $588
– 0.3 × $1,247).
The means-tested eligibility and benefit formulas immediately
reveal the tensions that exist in the Food Stamp Program between the
goals of maintaining program integrity and promoting self-sufficiency.
On the one hand, we want assistance to be targeted toward those who
are unfortunate enough to truly need it. Such targeting is necessary to
keep the program’s costs in line. It is also vital to maintaining public faith and support for the program. A few news exposés that catch
food stamp recipients using their assistance to purchase alcohol or lottery tickets or a well-covered political speech that rails against fraudulent beneficiaries collecting assistance on behalf of nonexistent family
members can quickly undo much of the goodwill that has built up in
the program.
On the other hand, means-testing also creates disincentives to
obtaining an income independently and becoming self-sufficient. Once
a family’s income passes the amounts of the deductibles in the netincome formula, its benefits are reduced (effectively “taxed”) at marginal rates of $0.30 for each extra dollar of unearned income and $0.24
for each extra dollar of earned income. We can get some perspective on
the possible disincentive effects of these benefit reduction rates by comparing them to regular income tax rates. In 2007, the highest marginal
federal income tax rate of 35 percent was only slightly steeper than the
food stamp unearned income benefit reduction rate, and the top federal
tax rate did not apply for married-couple households until their adjusted
incomes passed nearly $350,000! In that same year, marginal federal
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income tax rates of 25 percent did not apply until adjusted incomes of
married-couple households passed $63,700. In the 2007 tax year, less
than a quarter of U.S. tax filers paid marginal tax rates of 25 percent or
higher (U.S. Internal Revenue Service 2009). The food stamp benefit
reduction rate is less onerous than the rates in some other assistance
programs but nevertheless lowers the incentives to work.6
As we shall see, the tension between the program integrity and selfsufficiency goals, which appears in the benefit and eligibility formulas,
emerges in other aspects of the Food Stamp Program.

RECENT TRENDS IN FOOD STAMP RECEIPT AND WORK
After falling throughout the second half of the 1990s, food stamp
caseloads began to rise in 2001. Table 1.1 reports national estimates
of the average monthly food stamp caseload from FY 2001 through
FY 2007 as well as FY 2010 and FY 2014, which we compiled using
information from the Food Stamp Program Quality Control (FSPQC)
database.7
Table 1.1 Estimated Average Monthly Caseloads in the Food Stamp
Program, FY 2001–2007
Participating households
Fiscal
year
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2010
2014

All
(000s)
7,450
8,201
8,971
10,070
10,854
11,315
11,563
18,369
22,445

With
earnings
(000s)
2,009
2,299
2,533
2,896
3,180
3,364
3,445
5,498
7,016

Percent
with
earnings
27.0
28.0
28.2
28.8
29.3
29.7
29.8
29.9
31.3

Participating individuals
In house- Percent in
holds with households
All
earnings
with
(000s)
(000s)
earnings
17,297
6,603
38.2
19,041
7,426
39.0
20,934
8,105
38.7
23,486
9,249
39.4
24,881
9,901
39.8
25,595
10,493
41.0
25,926
10,632
41.0
39,759
16,179
40.7
45,847
19,477
42.5

SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from the Food Stamp Program Quality Control database.
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The estimates in Table 1.1 show that the numbers of participating
households and people in the Food Stamp Program rose steadily after
2001. The increases in the first few years of the data can be partly attributed to the deteriorating job market following the recession in 2001.
Nationally, the unemployment rate climbed through the middle of 2003,
peaking at 6.3 percent in June of that year. Unemployment subsequently
abated, falling to 4.4 percent by the end of 2006 and still holding near
that level at 4.7 percent in September 2007. Despite these improvements, food stamp caseloads continued to swell, with the fastest growth
occurring just after the job market turned around in 2003. By FY 2007,
the number of participating households was 55 percent higher than it
had been six years earlier, while the number of participating individuals
was 50 percent higher. Expressed another way, 8.6 percent of the U.S.
population was receiving food stamps in an average month in FY 2007
compared to 6.1 percent in 2001.8
For Table 1.1, we also estimate the number of participating households that reported receiving any earnings in the month as well as the
number of people living in those households. We refer to the households
with earnings as “working households.” The number of working food
stamp households rose over this period and grew faster than the overall
caseload. In an average month in FY 2001, working households made
up 27 percent of the food stamp caseload; by 2007, their share had risen
to nearly 30 percent. Working food stamp households are more likely
to be married and to have children than nonworking households and
therefore tend to be larger. As a result, the share of individual recipients
living in working households is larger than the share of working households itself. In FY 2001, just over 38 percent of food stamp recipients
were living in households with earnings, and by 2007, this share had
increased to 41 percent.
Table 1.1 shows that working households were both a substantial
and growing share of the food stamp caseload. This provides some initial evidence that food stamp benefits may have been playing an important supplementary role for families who were trying to support themselves through work. The trends also have some puzzling aspects, with
two features in the trends running counter to what standard economic
analyses would have predicted. The first puzzle, which we have already
mentioned, is that caseloads continued to rise long after the turning
point in the economy. Other things held constant, better job prospects
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after 2003 should have reduced financial needs among families and
consequently reduced the caseload. Instead, the caseload increased. The
second puzzle also involves the lack of a turning point, in this case in
the proportion of food stamp families with earnings. Despite a weakening job market from 2001 through 2003 and a fall in the proportion
of working families generally (Crouse, Douglas, and Hauan 2007), the
proportion of working food stamp households grew. Thus, the representation of working households in the program increased, not only relative to other food stamp families but also relative to their share in the
population. Although outside the window of our analysis, the table also
presents figures for 2010 and 2014, which show dramatic growth in the
program due to the economic downturn that began at the end of 2007.
The continued rise in the food stamp caseload after 2004 occurred
primarily because more people who were eligible for benefits joined or
remained on the program. A series of reports undertaken under federal
contract estimated numbers of eligible people and households and participation rates among eligible people and households. For these estimated rates, the analysts first ran household-level data from the annual
demographic (March) files of the Current Population Survey through
a microsimulation model that applied the income and asset tests to
impute eligibility for the households. They then separately calculated
the numbers of participants from administrative records. Participation
rates were obtained as the ratio of participating households to estimated
eligible households. Rates were estimated for all households and for
different types of households. Rates were also calculated for individuals
in the households.
Table 1.2 lists selected estimates from these reports for FY 2001 to
FY 2014, which show how changes in the numbers of eligible households and individuals and participation rates among these groups each
contributed to caseload growth. From FY 2001 through 2003, the
household participation rate hovered at around 50 percent; however, the
food stamp caseload grew because the number of eligible households
and individuals grew. In contrast, the numbers of eligible households
and individuals changed only slightly from FY 2004 to 2006. However,
the household participation rate jumped, reaching nearly 63 percent
by FY 2006. Similarly, the participation rate among individuals rose
from 56.1 percent in FY 2003 to 67.3 percent in 2006. The changes in
participation rates led to the increase in caseloads during these years.
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Table 1.2 Estimated Food Stamp Program Participation Rates, FY
2001–2007
Households

Fiscal
year
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2010
2014

Participation
Eligible
rate for all
Eligible
households
eligible
individuals
(000s)
households (%)
(000s)
15,107
48.0
31,223
16,693
47.6
34,388
17,784
50.0
36,707
18,079
55.3
37,921
18,219
58.9
37,951
17,779
62.7
37,418
18,499
61.8
38,922
23,268
74.6
52,204
23,415
88.1
51,026

Individuals
Participation
rate for eligible
Participation individuals in
rate for all
households
eligible
with earnings
individuals (%)
(%)
53.9
45.1
53.8
45.0
56.1
48.1
61.1
52.0
64.7
56.3
67.3
57.0
65.8
55.7
72.7
61.8
82.9
70.5

SOURCE: For 2001–2007, Leftin and Wolkwitz (2009, Tables 2 and 5); for 2010 and
2014, Gray and Cunnyngham (2016, Tables A.1, A.4, E.1, and E.4).

In FY 2007, the number of eligible households began growing again.
Although participation rates edged down, the overall caseload grew.
These reports also estimated participation rates for individuals living in households with earnings, which we reproduce in the last column of Table 1.2. The estimates show that people in eligible working
households were substantially less likely to participate than people in
other eligible households. Participation rates for working households
generally rose during the period that we study but at a slower pace than
the rates for other households. The estimates also imply that the number
of individuals in eligible working households generally increased after
2001.9
Table 1.2 also shows that the eligible population increased substantially due to the recession beginning in 2007. The participation rate continued its long-run growth, causing the SNAP population to grow even
during the economic recovery of 2010–2014.
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FOCUS ON FINANCIAL CHARACTERISTICS IN
EXISTING RESEARCH
Without a doubt, the income formulas that determine food stamp
eligibility and benefits are important to program participation. However, the formulas are poor candidates for explaining program trends
because they have changed so little over time. Over the period that we
examine, the benefit formulas were updated only for inflation with just
a few minor changes to definitions of income. Nevertheless, much of
the research on participation and caseloads in the Food Stamp Program
has focused on these financial aspects with little mention of other rules
and administrative features of the program.
Several multivariate research studies have focused on financial eligibility. One of the most widely cited articles was published in 1996 by
Blank and Ruggles, who examine spells of eligibility and participation
in the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC, the predecessor to TANF) and Food Stamp Programs, using 1985–1989 longitudinal
data on single mothers from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). Blank and Ruggles (1996) estimate eligibility based on
monthly financial criteria and participation on the basis of household
self-reports. The “spells” in their research refer to continuous sequences
of months in which households are financially eligible for benefits (eligibility spells) or report receiving benefits (participation spells). Blank
and Ruggles find that eligibility spells tend to be short, with the lengths
of spells being associated with skills and earnings abilities of the mothers. They also find that economic circumstances, such as changes in
employment and earnings, contribute in expected ways to how eligibility and participation spells were resolved.
What is especially interesting though for our purposes is the importance of nonfinancial characteristics. Blank and Ruggles (1996) estimate
that only a quarter of food stamp eligibility spells led to food stamp participation spells; they also estimate that 60 percent of food stamp participation spells ended with households still being eligible for benefits. On
average, the families exiting food stamps appeared to leave substantial
amounts of benefits on the table. Blank and Ruggles attribute these findings to “choices” among single mothers, speculating that these choices
might reflect unmeasured time and money costs of participation, social

12 Mueser, Ribar, and Tekin

stigma and psychological discomfort associated with participation, and
inconvenient but unspecified administrative procedures.
Gleason, Schochet, and Moffitt (1998) examine food stamp participation and nonparticipation spells among a broader group of households, using SIPP data from the early 1990s. They also find that most
food stamp participation spells were short. Unlike Blank and Ruggles,
Gleason et al. do not explicitly condition on eligibility, electing instead
to include indirect controls and examine “trigger events” that were
defined in terms of income shocks and demographic changes. Gleason
et al. find that most, though far from all, changes in participation are
associated with these trigger events. For example, just over half of the
movements onto the Food Stamp Program were preceded by decreases
in earnings among household members. Although framed differently
than the study by Blank and Ruggles, the study by Gleason et al. leaves
much less room for administrative and other nonfinancial explanations
of program behavior.
Mills et al. (2001), who examine transitions out of the Food Stamp
Program among single mothers in linked 1997–1999 Current Population Survey data, also find that economic changes, such as increases
in earnings, and demographic changes, such as births and the aging
of children, were responsible for many families’ exits from assistance.
Farrell et al. (2003) also look at data from the late 1990s but use the
SIPP. Their research focuses on families who were eligible for food
stamps and includes controls for current and past income. They find
that households whose incomes were variable and only temporarily low
were less likely to participate than households whose incomes were
permanently low. However, they also find that less than a quarter of
eligible nonparticipants had temporarily low incomes. A volume edited
by Jolliffe and Ziliak (2008) reports mixed evidence regarding income
variability, with some analyses indicating that it increases food stamp
participation but others indicating that it does the opposite.
These and other multivariate studies show that food stamp participation is lower for households with earnings than for other households,
even after we account for other differences between these households,
such as differences in the sizes and age compositions of the families.
Plainly, participation is lower because earnings reduce eligibility. However, as several of the studies show, participation is also lower among
eligible working families.
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What explains this pattern of reduced participation? One answer is
lower benefits. Fraker and Moffitt (1988) and Keane and Moffitt (1998)
estimate models of employment, food stamp use, and other program
use and find that increases in the generosity of the food stamp benefit
formula increase participation. Cross-tabulations reported by Leftin
and Wolkwitz (2009) also indicate that participation rates increase with
expected benefits. Thus, to the extent that working households expect
fewer benefits, they are less likely to enroll in the Food Stamp Program.
Reduced benefits, however, provide only a partial explanation for
lower participation. As Blank and Ruggles (1996) have reported, eligible nonparticipating families forgo considerable sums. We can update
these figures using estimates from Leftin and Wolkwitz (2009). They
calculate that in an average month in FY 2007, 6.4 million working
households were eligible for $1.2 billion in food stamp benefits. Of
these, 3.3 million participated, claiming $868 million in assistance. This
means that the remaining 3.1 million households could have claimed
$281 million, or about $106 per household. These expected benefits
were far below those going to participating households (about $260 per
household) yet much higher than the expected benefits for nonworking
nonparticipants ($55 per household).10 So, the average foregone benefits of participation are higher for working nonparticipant households
than for nonworking nonparticipant households.
Another possible explanation for the difference in participation
rates is a difference in program knowledge. The argument for this is
that nonworking households have more information about Food Stamp
Program rules either because they have more time available to them or
because they receive assistance from other programs where they come
into contact with caseworkers and other sources of program data. This
explanation is plausible for differences in program entry, but it falls
apart when considering program exits where households would have
already been exposed to program rules. The research by Blank and
Ruggles shows that eligible working families are more likely to end
their food stamp spells than eligible nonworking families.
Stigma associated with benefit receipt and use is another potential
explanation (Moffitt 1983). People who are embarrassed about using
food stamps or EBT cards might also be more likely to work. More
generally, attitudes regarding the importance of self-reliance might
affect both participation and work, leading to the negative association
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between them. Stigma, attitudes, and preferences may be important, but
to explain the increases in participation we would need an explanation
of why these attitudes weakened over the last few years. One would
expect stigma to be less important in explaining lower rates of recertification, since presumably those receiving food stamps had to overcome
such stigma in order to apply in the first case.

PROGRAM ADMINISTRATION
Recent research indicates that other administrative changes may
have contributed to the growth in food stamp participation rates and
caseloads. As we mentioned, the states, not the federal government, are
responsible for direct client contact and implementing program rules.
In this role, the states shape administrative policies and practices under
the umbrella of broad federal guidelines. The states’ administrative discretion was increased through changes in USDA policies and by the
2002 Farm Bill, including changes that allowed states to make the Food
Stamp Program more accessible and convenient for working families.
Among common modifications was the removal or easing of reporting
requirements involving automobiles owned by the household. Some
states have gone as far as eliminating all asset requirements. Moves
by states to establish online registration systems have allowed working
families to interact with the agency by phone or Internet, substituting
for in-person interviews. We return to a discussion of these local policies in the final chapter, when we discuss the evolution of state policy
up to the present.
This book focuses on two policies that are especially relevant for
working families: policies of certification and recertification, and treatment of able-bodied adults without dependents.
Certification and Recertification
Rules for financial eligibility for food stamps are based on monthly
criteria, and economic research that has examined individual participation histories has often assumed that eligibility is checked monthly.
However, this is not how the program operates for many people.
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When a family applies for food stamps, its financial information is
checked and verified. For example, applicants are asked to document
their sources of income by providing names of employers and copies
of pay stubs. Other information is supplied, including the location and
cost of the residence and the names, ages, and disability status of other
members. Documentation for these items may include utility bills, rent
statements, birth certificates, and social security cards. The initial verification process usually also requires a face-to-face interview with a
caseworker, although this has been replaced with phone interviews in a
growing number of states.
These procedures are a hurdle for needy families, especially those
who work, because they require a substantial amount of time and effort.
An employed household head may have to take one day off work to
submit her application and another day to attend the interview. Because
many low-wage jobs lack benefits, the time off from work is likely to
be unpaid. For each of these visits, she may also have to wait for public
transportation or arrange a ride with a friend or relative if the family
does not have their own car.
The procedures also impose costs on the state governments because
they must keep offices open and pay caseworkers to process the applications, conduct interviews, and verify the information. Nevertheless,
verification procedures are necessary to maintain program integrity.
There is not much controversy regarding whether verification should be
done but rather how and how often.
States reduce the costs and inconvenience of verification while still
maintaining program integrity and more accurate payments by certifying households to receive benefits for given periods of time. During the certification period, which can be a single month but usually
ranges from a quarter of a year to as much as two years, the household is
required to report certain types of changes in income and circumstances
but might not need to provide the same documentation or undergo the
same rigorous checks as at the initial application. At the end of the certification period, the household would supply some or all this information to recertify its eligibility and payment status.
The processes of certification and recertification mean that food
stamp households confront much higher administrative obstacles at the
time of their initial applications and at subsequent recertification dates
than at other points during their program participation spells. There is
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growing evidence that the frequency of recertification affects families’
program participation (Kabbani and Wilde 2003) and the duration of
food stamp participation spells (Gray 2018; Ribar, Edelhoch, and Liu
2008; Staveley, Stevens, and Wilde 2002).
Recertification policies help to explain some of the disparity in participation rates between working and nonworking households. States
often set different recertification intervals for households with different
types of income. The intervals for households with earnings are usually
shorter than the intervals for households that rely entirely on unearned
sources, such as TANF, retirement, or disability income. For example,
South Carolina’s recertification interval for working households before
FY 2003 was three months, while its interval for many nonworking
households was one year. The shorter intervals mean that working
households face substantially higher costs of program compliance than
do nonworking households.
Along these same lines, changes in recertification requirements may
have contributed to changes in participation rates. In the early 2000s,
many states increased their recertification intervals, which reduced
compliance costs for families and may have increased participation.
The USDA also gave states the option to use phone or mail-in recertifications instead of face-to-face interviews for recertifications within
a one-year interval, making these interim recertifications less onerous.
Ribar, Edelhoch, and Liu (2008) estimate that South Carolina’s lengthening of its effective recertification interval for working families from
three months to six months in FY 2003 may have increased that state’s
family food stamp caseload by 8 percent.11 This research indicates that
recertification intervals may be an especially potent administrative tool.
Still, since this earlier work was based on a single state, it remains to
be seen how patterns differ across states. Our consideration of Georgia
and Missouri, in addition to South Carolina, allows us to extend and
generalize results.
ABAWD Work Rules and Time Limits
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act of 1996 (PRWORA), which overhauled the cash welfare system,
also introduced work requirements and time limits for able-bodied
adults without dependents (ABAWDs) in the Food Stamp Program.

Introduction 17

The law specifies that ABAWDs who do not work are eligible for only
three months of benefits in any three-year period. The requirements
likely reduced food stamp participation among ABAWDS, at least initially. ABAWDs who were unable or unwilling to work would have had
their participation curtailed by the short time limits, and some of those
who did comply with the work requirements would have lost benefits
and possibly eligibility through increased earnings. At the same time,
the requirements would have altered the composition of the remaining
ABAWD caseload by reducing the number of nonworkers and increasing the proportion of workers.
Over time, however, the ABAWD work provisions were relaxed,
and their impacts on participation and employment may have decreased.
PRWORA allowed states to request waivers of the work requirements
for ABAWDs living in economically distressed areas. In addition, starting in 1997, states also had the option of exempting up to 15 percent of
their caseload from the ABAWD restrictions. The number of ABAWDs
who were actually subject to the requirements decreased as more states
exercised their discretion to waive the rules or exempt clients. In January 2001, 37 states had waivers covering parts of their territories; by
FY 2008, as the recession loomed, the number of states with approved
waivers had grown to 47.
Along with the rising numbers of states requesting any types of
waivers, there were growing numbers of requests to implement statewide waivers—that is, to designate the entire state as having insufficient jobs. In FY 2008, these included Alaska, the District of Columbia, Michigan, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, and
South Carolina. ABAWDs make up only a small share of the caseload.
The FSPQC data indicate that only 8 percent of food stamp households in FY 2007 included an ABAWD as a member. However, that
figure was up from just 7 percent of households in FY 2001. Consistent
with the relaxed work requirements, employment in the participating
ABAWD households was down slightly from 30 percent in FY 2001
to 29 percent in FY 2007. The decreased employment among ABAWD
households contrasts noticeably with increased employment among
other households.
In Chapter 4 we examine the effects of ABAWD policies in more
detail. The waivers in our three states were applied on an area-by-area
basis, with the set of areas changing over time. This provides a natural

18 Mueser, Ribar, and Tekin

way to test their impact. In particular, we can compare participation
outcomes across areas and populations that are and are not exempt from
the policies. As with the analysis of recertification intervals, we examine how exits from the Food Stamp Program vary with the duration of
a person’s or household’s program spell. Because the ABAWD policies involve a three-month time window, they should have their largest
effect at the start of a food stamp spell.
This work follows on analyses for South Carolina in Ribar,
Edelhoch, and Liu (2010), which examined Food Stamp Program spells
for ABAWDs from 1996 to 2005. However, that analysis is limited
by the fact that in 2003 South Carolina obtained exemptions from the
ABAWD time limit in all counties. Analyses of Georgia and Missouri
allow us to extend both the time period and scope of the analyses.

ORGANIZATION OF THE BOOK
The focus of this book is the effect of administrative policies on
the food stamp participation behavior of the working poor. The book
reports results from empirical analyses of large samples of administrative case records drawn from the states of Georgia, Missouri, and South
Carolina from FY 2001 through 2007. The next chapter in the book
describes these data and the analytical samples and measures drawn
from them. We examine how the case characteristics for our three states
compare to characteristics for the nation as a whole. The chapter compares the characteristics of these groups to the characteristics of the
general state caseloads. We also examine alternative ways in which
“working” households can be defined.
The next two chapters of the book consider specific administrative
policies: recertification intervals and ABAWD work rules. Each chapter
reviews the policies in detail, discusses the incentives or obstacles these
create for working households’ food stamp participation, and summarizes the existing research on their effects. The chapters then examine
the association between these policies and households’ participation
behavior, using the administrative data.
The final chapter discusses additional administrative policies that
changed from FY 2001 through 2007 and how these modifications
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mostly worked to the benefit of households with earnings. We also consider changes occurring since 2007 and discuss their likely impacts.
Despite variations in the program, the issues addressed in our analysis remain relevant. The recertification requirements remain much the
same in most states. While the program has often undergone modernization in its implementation, including increased use of the Internet
and call centers, evidence suggests that many households still have difficulty meeting recertification requirements.12 The proportion of SNAP
recipients classified as ABAWDs increased from less than 15 percent
to over 20 percent as states obtained waivers of work requirements following the onset of the recession in 2007. Although waivers in many
states lapsed after 2013, the proportion remained close to that level at
least through 2015. In recent years, the SNAP program has received
greater attention as a variety of proposals to alter its structure have been
floated. Perhaps more than ever, the role of the program in aiding the
working poor is in the spotlight. In light of recent developments, we
consider ways in which the program can be modified to be less onerous
for working households while still addressing valid program concerns.

Notes
1. In contrast, the primary program providing cash support to poor families, Aid to
Families with Dependent Children, was replaced with a block grant. For a discussion of the politics underlying the relative stability of the Food Stamp Program
over time, see Gitter (2015).
2. Since the program is administered at the state level, each state determines the
name under which the program operates. As of 2018, 6 states continue to use the
name Food Stamp Program, 28 states use SNAP, and the remainder use some
other name. See www.usac.org/_res/documents/li/pdf/samples/SNAP-Programs
-by-State.pdf (accessed September 3, 2018).
3. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996
replaced Aid to Families with Dependent Children, an open-ended entitlement,
with Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, a nonentitlement, block-grant
system. Because of the declines in welfare caseloads since the block grants were
instituted, no state has yet confronted the situation of suspending TANF enrollments or payments, although many states have instituted provisions that restrict
eligibility for TANF. In principle, however, the loss of entitlement status means
that eligible households could be turned away.
4. Higher thresholds apply in Alaska and Hawaii, reflecting the higher food costs
and other costs of living in those states. Different thresholds are also in place for
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5.
6.

7.

8.

9.
10.
11.
12.

some types of households with elderly disabled members. In the rest of the book,
we will only consider rules that apply to the contiguous states. As our primary
concern will be with potential working households, we will provide only limited
discussion of rules applying exclusively to elderly or disabled recipients.
The modification of asset limits occurred under what has become known as
“broad-based categorical eligibility,” which we discuss in Chapter 5. See Falk and
Aussenberg (2014).
Many SNAP households receive services from other government programs, and
recipients’ effective marginal tax rates are influenced by the interaction of these
programs. Overall effective tax rates vary dramatically (Moffitt 2016). Hoynes and
Schanzenbach (2012) examine the effects of the Food Stamp Program on work.
Data in the annual FSPQC files are obtained through case reviews and surveys of
a large random sample of food stamp households in all states (see Wolkwitz and
Ewell [2008] for details regarding the database). The underlying data are assembled to determine errors that the states may be making in their eligibility decisions
and benefit awards. The FSPQC data exclude households receiving disaster assistance and recipients facing case closures but appealing those decisions. Because
of these exclusions, the FSPQC caseload figures fall a little short of figures based
solely on administrative data. For instance, the administrative records indicate that
11.8 million households and 26.1 million people received food stamps in an average month in FY 2007, while the FSPQC data record only 11.6 million households
and 25.9 million people.
The literature shows that the economy was an important determinant of the food
stamp caseload but that caseload growth during the middle of the first decade of
the 2000s was due to policy changes. See Klerman and Danielson (2011), Ganong
and Liebman (2018), and Ziliak (2016).
Rough estimates of the numbers of eligible people in working households can be
formed by dividing the Table 1.1 values for individuals participating from working households by the participation rates from Table 1.2.
Lower benefits for this latter group in large part reflect higher levels of unearned
(usually transfer) income. Different levels of deductions—for example, due to
excess housing expenses—may also be responsible for differences in benefits.
Technically, South Carolina increased its certification period for working families
to 12 months, with an interim report at 6 months.
As we note in Chapter 3, using data in six states extending up through 2011, Gray
(2018) shows that recipients are particularly likely to lose benefits at the time of
recertification. Although phone interviews might be expected to ease recertification, Heflin, London, and Mueser (2013) provide evidence that this is not always
the case.

2
Who Works, Really?
OVERVIEW
To examine how rules and administrative practices in the Food
Stamp Program affect participation and other outcomes among working
poor households, we need measures of households’ program participation, measures of the policies and program rules that households face,
and, especially, measures of households’ work status. Ideally, these
measures should be as specific, accurate, and complete as possible. For
example, we want the ability to characterize the particular policies, such
as recertification dates and work-related time limits, that certain groups
of households face at a given point in time and examine households’
behavior at those same points in time.
While it is easy to specify our data needs, it is much harder to find
data sources that have all the necessary measures or that record these
measures accurately. Researchers turn to two principal sources. The
first is information from questionnaire surveys, such as the Current
Population Survey (CPS), the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). Surveys
tend to have reliable information on household employment (the CPS is
the source of monthly U.S. household labor statistics) and demographic
characteristics. However, survey respondents also tend to underreport
their participation in public assistance programs, including the Food
Stamp Program, and to poorly report the timing of program transitions.
The number of respondents who are at risk of participating in the Food
Stamp Program is also usually modest, and sample sizes become even
smaller when particular groups, such as able-bodied adults without
dependents (ABAWDs), are considered.
The second general source of information is administrative program
records. These provide extraordinarily accurate measures of program
participation and benefit receipt, so they overcome some of the reporting problems of survey data. They also contain all the information that
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is available to caseworkers and program administrators and thus can be
used to describe the policy context for clients. In addition, administrative records have large numbers of observations—often the universe
of program participants served by a state agency—and can provide us
with precise estimates of relationships for narrowly defined groups. At
the same time, administrative data have drawbacks. The biggest for
our purposes is that work status, earnings, and income are likely to be
underreported for strategic or policy reasons. Thus, it can be difficult to
determine who really works. Other measures, such as education, race,
and ethnicity, which are not strictly needed for program administration
but are relevant for an empirical analysis, may be missing or inaccurately recorded. There is also the prosaic issue that administrative case
records contain sensitive information, require substantial confidentiality protections, and are therefore difficult to obtain.
Of the two sources, administrative case records are better for our
purposes. We obtain food stamp case records from three states—Georgia, Missouri, and South Carolina—covering fiscal years (FYs) 2001–
2007, which describe households’ participation, food stamp benefits,
and other program-related characteristics. In this chapter, we discuss
the data, explain their strengths and limitations, and describe the analytical records and measures that we develop from them.
Although we consider three different states that cover several different policy contexts and economic situations, we recognize that our
states are not fully representative of all states. To consider how our
analyses might be affected by the particular selection of states, we compare the measures on program outcomes and household characteristics
from the states’ administrative data sets to a repeated, cross-section
sample of administrative records from all states that is available from
the Food Stamp Program Quality Control (FSPQC) database.
Also, because of concerns about the reliability of work status information in the case records, we link the records to another administrative
data set—quarterly earnings records from each state’s Unemployment
Insurance (UI) system—which provides an independent indication of
work status. The UI earnings records have limitations of their own. For
example, they do not include earnings from out-of-state employers or
federal employment, and they overlook certain types of jobs, such as
some agricultural and domestic work jobs, that UI does not cover. Also,
the quarterly periodicity of the UI earnings records does not match the
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monthly periodicity of reported earnings from the food stamp records.
Nevertheless, the UI earnings records provide valuable information
about the reliability of the food stamp records. Comparisons of the
two data sources reveal that work and earnings are substantially underreported in the food stamp records. Work appears to be much more common among food stamp recipients than is indicated in the case records.1

DATA FROM CASE RECORDS
As we discussed in Chapter 1, the Food Stamp Program is a federalstate partnership—the federal government pays the costs of benefits and
half the cost of administration, and state governments are responsible
for the remaining administrative costs and the day-to-day operations
of the program. For our states, the responsible administrative agencies
are the Georgia Department of Human Services, the Missouri Department of Social Services, and the South Carolina Department of Social
Services. Each of these organizations operates and maintains electronic
databases for their programs that are used by caseworkers, benefits
operations, managers, and program officials. The systems record the
information from initial applications, updates reported to or discovered
by caseworkers, agency decisions regarding cases, benefits that are
issued, and other actions. They contain the data that the agencies use to
determine eligibility, benefit amounts, and program compliance among
households that ask for assistance.
These properties make the data incredibly valuable for our analyses.
Consider the longitudinal participation histories that are the focus of the
subsequent chapters of this book. Program records identify the precise
dates that people began and stopped receiving benefits. The data on
start and stop dates do not rely on people’s memories or cooperation,
so they are not subject to recall, misreporting, nonresponse, or attrition problems that affect surveys, especially longitudinal surveys (see,
e.g., Bound, Brown, and Mathiowetz [2001]). The administrative data
contain similarly accurate information on other program outcomes,
such as benefit amounts, agency decisions, and special group status.
They also accurately record the program information that was available
to the agency and the basis for its actions—for example, the earnings
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amounts, unearned income amounts, and household size that the agency
used to determine eligibility and benefits.2
The administrative systems also contain the universe of cases, so
there is an enormous number of observations that we can consider.
The large numbers of observations allow us to consider special policyrelevant groups yet still generate highly precise estimates. They also
allow us to disaggregate the records in various ways. In addition, our
data are available over a relatively long window of seven years, which
means that we have an unusually large number of complete participation spells that we can examine.
The electronic case records also have shortcomings. First, we only
have records that cover the periods when households are participating
in the Food Stamp Program. Although we get an accurate count of participants and accurate measures of the programmatic characteristics of
their assistance spells, we do not observe them before or after they participate in the Food Stamp Program. In FY 2007, only about two-thirds
of the people who appeared to be financially eligible to participate in the
Food Stamp Program actually did so (Leftin and Wolkwitz 2009); the
use of administrative data does not allow us to examine all of the factors that contribute to participation. For longitudinal analyses, the data
allow us to examine the durations of assistance spells and the timing of
spell exits; however, since we do not have information on the population from which food stamp entrants are selected, we cannot study the
determinants of SNAP entry or the role of prior program participation.
Second, the measures in the records are limited in scope and do not contain many of the individual or family characteristics that are commonly
included in surveys, such as health status or family background. Also,
the quality and availability of some measures that are included in the
records but not essential to program administration—such as people’s
education levels, race/ethnicity, and marital status—can be poor, given
that the caseworkers have very little incentive to verify them.
Third, clients have some incentives to misreport information. For
example, reporting extra earnings or income could lead to a loss of benefits or eligibility. Earnings that occur “off the books” or from selfemployment might not be reported to authorities. Careful ethnographic
studies of disadvantaged families and adults by Edin and Lein (1997)
and Venkatesh (2006) find that unreported work and underground economic activity are common coping strategies. For example, Edin and
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Lein find that about 40 percent of the welfare-reliant single mothers
they interviewed engaged in unreported work during the preceding
year. Overall, approximately 9 percent of the U.S. economy has been
classified as part of the shadow economy, and such informal economic
activities are relatively more important in states with more social program recipients (Wiseman 2013).
Even if strategic underreporting was not an issue, the food stamp
authorities do not necessarily require a full reporting of earnings every
month. In particular, all three states that we examine used “prospective reporting” for earnings, which essentially required that clients only
report jobs that were likely to continue into the next month. Households
were also only supposed to report reasonably anticipated earnings (e.g.,
they could exclude overtime if it was occasional and unpredictable). At
different times each of the states had simplified income reporting policies, in which some types of income or income changes did not need
to be reported. In South Carolina, for example, clients in the middle of
a certification period were not required to report changes in income if
their total incomes were below the gross income threshold of 130 percent of the federal poverty line.
Finally, there is some ambiguity as to how a case, or food stamp
unit, is determined. Normally, it is defined as a single person or household whose members buy and prepare food together. An unrelated individual who buys and prepares food separately may be excluded from
the unit, and such an individual may qualify as a separate unit, whether
or not the household qualifies. Although regulations limit the extent to
which related household members can form independent units, in some
cases the food stamp unit may be formed strategically. Unfortunately,
we have no information on individuals who are not part of a food stamp
unit, nor on how units may be related to one another, so we simply take
them as given and refer to them as households.
Analysis Files
From the FY 2001–2007 administrative data for each state’s Food
Stamp Program, we prepare analysis files by first selecting records for
each month in which a case (usually a household) received a positive
amount of food stamp benefits. This leads to an unbalanced panel analysis data set with one observation per case per month of benefit receipt
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and observations for individual cases linked through case identifiers.
From the case-level administrative data, we also obtain measures of
each case’s monthly benefits, reported earned and unearned incomes,
deductions, and county of residence. We express all dollar-denominated
values in constant 2007 amounts, using the Consumer Price Index for
all Urban Consumers (CPI-U).
The food stamp administrative data also contain records for each
person (client) who is associated with a case in a given month. We
use this information to calculate the total number of people in the case
as well as the age distribution of the members (e.g., the presence and
number of children, the presence of elderly members). The records also
indicate one client who is the head or primary informant for the case.
For this person, we also obtain measures of his/her age, race/ethnicity,
education, and marital status.
We drop monthly records for cases in which any of the measures
of the head’s or household’s characteristics are missing. For all of our
analyses, we also only consider cases in which there is a head who is at
least 18 years of age (i.e., we drop “child-only” cases) and no older than
90.3 One state—Missouri—only provided us with limited quarterly data
from FY 2001–2003 but provided us with full monthly data afterward.
Because of this we omit FY 2001–2003 observations from Missouri. To
make our files more manageable, we randomly selected 1 out of every
11 cases in each state. Even with this selection, sampling error is so
small that we focus exclusively on the substantive interpretation of the
estimates, since differences large enough to be of importance are almost
always statistically significant.
Finally, for the analyses in this chapter (but not in our later chapters), we only consider observations for the months of March, June,
September, and December (the final months of each quarter). The reason for doing this is to align our case record data with other data that
we will subsequently consider from each state’s UI earnings records.4

DATA FROM UI EARNINGS RECORDS
We link the information from the food stamp case records to information on quarterly earnings from each state’s UI system. UI benefits
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are paid to eligible, covered workers who lose their jobs through no
fault of their own. Eligibility for UI benefits depends on people’s work
and earnings histories over the five quarters prior to losing their jobs.
The amount of benefits also depends on the level of earnings. To administer their UI systems and determine eligibility for both UI benefits and
actual benefit amounts, states record the quarterly earnings from each
covered job that a person has.
For each person in each food stamp case in each quarter, we tally
all the earnings from all jobs in the UI database. A successful match to
a UI earnings record indicates that the person worked sometime during
the quarter; however, the UI record does not indicate precisely when.
A failure to match to a UI earnings record could indicate one of several
things. First, it might be the case that the person did not work at all
during that quarter and thus did not have any earnings. Second, it is
possible that the person worked but did so in a job that was not covered
by the UI system, such as domestic work. Third, it is possible that the
person worked “off the books,” either in an informal position, such as a
baby-sitter, in an underground or illicit job, or for an employer who did
not report to the state UI system. Fourth, records can be matched only
if people’s social security numbers are accurately reported to both the
food stamp agency and the employer. Edin and Lein (1997) describe
how public assistance recipients sometimes misreport social security
numbers to employers to avoid having their earnings detected. Fifth, the
UI records for Georgia and South Carolina are limited to people who
work in those states; a person who worked in another state (e.g., a resident of Rock Hill, South Carolina, who commuted to nearby Charlotte,
North Carolina) would not have a record in his or her state of residence.
Because of a data-sharing agreement between Missouri and Kansas, the
UI records for those two states are merged with Missouri food stamp
data; however, data are not available for other states. For all these reasons, we must recognize that the UI earnings records understate the
incidence of work for pay.
For our analyses, we add the UI earnings for all people in a food
stamp case together to form a measure of case or household UI earnings. To make these quarterly figures comparable to the monthly reports
in the food stamp records, we divide the figures by three to obtain a
monthly equivalent. As with our other dollar-denominated measures,
we also adjust for inflation using the CPI-U.
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COMPARISONS WITH THE FOOD STAMP PROGRAM
QUALITY CONTROL DATABASE
Our initial analyses compare the food stamp administrative case
records from Georgia, Missouri, and South Carolina with national,
cross-section administrative data for FY 2001–2007 from the FSPQC
database. Data in the FSPQC files are obtained through case reviews
and surveys of a large random sample of food stamp households in
all states (see Wolkwitz and Ewell [2008]). The underlying data in the
FSPQC are assembled to determine errors that the states sometimes
make in their eligibility decisions and benefit awards. Thus, the data
include nearly all the same measures as the three states’ administrative
files. Despite the omission of a small number of cases included in state
files of SNAP recipients, we examine the FSPQC data because they
contain detailed and cross-validated information about participants,
including their earnings status.5 The FSPQC data are also the basis for
annual reports describing the characteristics of food stamp households
(see, e.g., Wolkwitz and Leftin [2008]).
Table 2.1 lists average characteristics of food stamp households for
the United States as a whole (based on data from the FSPQC) in the first
column and characteristics of households from each of our three analysis states (based on the states’ own administrative data) in the next three
columns. The FSPQC data come from all months of each year, while the
individual state administrative data come from end-of-quarter months.
Additionally, the figures for Missouri only cover FY 2004–2007.6
The estimates in Table 2.1 indicate that food stamp households in
the three states we analyze were similar to the nation as a whole in
terms of their size, the age of the household head, and the average level
of food stamp benefits. However, there were also some noticeable differences. All three of our analysis states had fewer Hispanic recipients,
fewer elderly recipients, poorer recipients (due mostly to lower levels of unearned income), and higher proportions of recipients with no
reported case income than the average for the United States. Additionally, Georgia had more households with children and more households
that reported earnings than other states. Because they had lower overall incomes and a higher share of income from earnings, Georgia food
stamp households also received a higher proportion of their potential
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Table 2.1 Average Characteristics of Food Stamp Households in the
United States, Georgia, Missouri, and South Carolina
United
States
Demographic characteristics
Number of people in household
Percent with children in household
Number of children in household
Percent with elderly members
Percent with married household head
Percent with black household headb
Percent with Hispanic household headb
Household head’s age
Household head’s years of education
Economic characteristics
Gross monthly income ($)
Gross monthly unearned income ($)
Gross monthly earnings ($)
Gross monthly income as % of poverty
Percent with reported earnings
Percent with no reported income
Area unemployment rated
Program characteristics
Monthly food stamp benefits ($)
Maximum food stamp allotment ($)
Monthly benefits as % of allotment

South
Georgia Missouri a Carolina

2.3
53.3
1.2
18.1
14.9
32.2
15.7
42.5
N.A.c

2.4
61.5
1.3
10.4
17.4
62.0
3.1
39.1
11.3

2.3
49.4
1.0
14.3
18.3
31.7
1.5
40.6
11.4

2.4
56.1
1.2
16.2
13.8
64.3
0.4
41.8
10.8

720
451
269
59.1
28.8
12.6
5.2

607
292
315
47.6
31.5
30.2
5.0

623
330
293
51.1
28.6
28.9
5.8

635
366
268
50.7
27.6
20.9
6.9

214
321
65.2

239
339
70.7

216
297
63.2

223
334
64.9

Data from Missouri only available from FY 2004–2007.
Race and ethnicity measures in the FSPQC were redefined in FY 2007; estimates in the
table are based on FY 2001–2006 data.
c
Education information is missing for many people in the FSPQC database and is not
considered to be reliable.
d
Total U.S. unemployment rate used in first column; unemployment rate for county of
residence used in remaining columns.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations for the United States from the Food Stamp Program
Quality Control (FSPQC) database, and authors’ calculations for individual states
from end-of-quarter administrative records. All dollar estimates have been adjusted
for inflation to December 2007 values using the Consumer Price Index for Urban
Consumers.
a

b
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monthly benefits. Georgia and Missouri had more married households
than the other states, and Georgia and South Carolina had more black
recipients than other states. Missouri and South Carolina experienced
higher rates of unemployment than the rest of the country. Thus, each of
our analysis states had a caseload with some unique demographic and
economic characteristics.
We can also compare trends in the percentage of the food stamp
households that reported receiving earnings (and thus working) in our
three analysis states and the United States as a whole. The relevant figures are listed in Table 2.2. As we discussed in the previous chapter,
the percentage of food stamp households in the United States reporting
earnings steadily rose from 27.0 percent in FY 2001 to 29.8 percent in
FY 2007. Although Georgia had higher percentages of households with
earnings than the rest of the country and South Carolina had slightly
lower percentages, trends in both states were upward. In contrast, the
data for Missouri, which are only available for FY 2004–2007, show no
discernible trend.

COMPARISONS OF FOOD STAMP REPORTED EARNINGS
AND UI EARNINGS
Earnings information in the food stamp administrative records
is recorded on a monthly basis, while earnings information in the UI
administrative databases is recorded quarterly. To make comparisons
between the two systems as meaningful as possible, we restrict our endof-quarter observations from the food stamp administrative records to
cases that had participated for three consecutive months and thus that
had an entire quarter of earnings information.
Food stamp households in our three analysis states report their earnings to their state agencies prospectively. Changes in earnings could
occur after a household has already received its monthly benefits. To
reduce the possible influence of households that experience such earnings boosts, we further restrict our analysis to end-of-quarter cases that
continued receiving food stamp benefits for at least the first month of
the subsequent quarter. Restricting the analysis sample to cases that had
participated for all three months of a given quarter and at least the first
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Table 2.2 Trends in the Percentage of Food Stamp Households
Reporting Earnings in the United States, Georgia, Missouri,
and South Carolina
Fiscal year
United States
Georgia
Missouri a South Carolina
2001
27.0
30.3
26.0
2002
28.0
29.5
26.3
2003
28.2
30.7
27.3
2004
28.8
31.3
28.0
27.8
2005
29.3
31.8
29.2
28.1
2006
29.7
32.0
28.7
28.3
2007
29.8
32.6
28.4
28.3
a
Data from Missouri only available from FY 2004–2007.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations for the United States from the Food Stamp Program
Quality Control database, and authors’ calculations for individual states from end-ofquarter administrative records.

month of the next quarter results in a sample that is slightly more disadvantaged than the sample used in Tables 2.1 and 2.2. However, the
restrictions do not have a substantial effect on our findings.
Quarterly earnings that were reported to food stamp agencies in our
three states and from the UI databases were highly, though imperfectly,
correlated. In Georgia, the correlation between earnings amounts was
0.57; in Missouri, 0.63; and in South Carolina, 0.67.
Table 2.3 compares the incidence of earnings reported to food
stamp agencies and those reported to the UI system in our three analysis
states. The vast majority of earnings incidence reports agreed. In Georgia, 77.7 percent of the reports agreed, with 52.5 percent of households
reporting no earnings to both the food stamp agency and UI system, and
25.2 percent reporting some earnings to both systems. In Missouri and
South Carolina, 81.5 percent and 80 percent of the incidence reports
agreed, respectively.
In all three states, there were also substantial fractions of households—10 percent in Georgia, 5.2 percent in Missouri, and 5.7 percent
in South Carolina—that reported earnings to food stamp agencies but
that had no earnings recorded in the UI system. Some of these households may have had members who worked out of state and who had
earnings recorded in another state’s UI system. Other households may
have had members working in uncovered jobs. In some cases, house-
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Table 2.3 Comparisons of Quarterly Earnings Reports from Food Stamp
and UI Records (%)
South
Georgia Missouria Carolina
No earnings reported to food stamp
52.5
58.9
56.3
agency or UI
Earnings reported to food stamp agency
25.2
22.6
23.7
and UI
Earnings reported to food stamp agency
10.0
5.2
5.7
but not to UI
Earnings reported to UI but not to food
12.3
13.3
14.3
stamp agency
Data from Missouri only available from FY 2004–2007.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from end-of-quarter food stamp administrative records
for households that received benefits for all three months of the quarter and for the
first month of the subsequent quarter matched to UI earnings records.
a

holds may have reported future expected earnings for jobs that ended
prior to the quarter in which the employer reported earnings.
There were also sizable fractions of households—12.3 percent in
Georgia, 13.3 percent in Missouri, and 14.3 percent in South Carolina—that had recorded earnings in their state’s UI systems but who did
not report any earnings to food stamp agencies. In some cases, these
earnings may have been from short, temporary, or irregular jobs or from
permanent opportunities that did not work out. If the job was unanticipated and if it did not last beyond the month, the state might not have
required the job to be included in the household’s prospective earnings.
In other cases, however, it is possible that either the households or caseworkers failed to properly report incomes. Indeed, the quality control
process estimated that the cumulative food stamp overpayment error
rates (errors that included underreported earnings but also other things)
from FY 2001 to 2007 ranged from 4.0 to 7.2 percent in Georgia, 2.0 to
8.1 percent in Missouri, and 3.4 to 5.5 percent in South Carolina.7
The results from Table 2.3 indicate that neither the records in the
state UI systems nor the reports made directly to food stamp agencies
capture the full extent of work among food stamp households. Although
about a quarter to a third of the households in our three states report
working for pay to food stamp agencies in a given quarter, the incidence
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of work is at least 12–14 percentage points higher than that. Thus, the
actual fraction of working food stamp households may be close to one
half.
Sanctioned or not, the apparent underreporting of earnings in the
food stamp system leads to questions regarding which types of households are more likely to make different types of reports. Table 2.4 lists
the average characteristics of households in each of our analysis states
that did or did not report earnings to the food stamp agencies and to
their state’s UI system. Households that did not report earnings to either
system tended to have fewer members, be less likely to have children,
be older, be less likely to be married, and have larger unearned incomes
than other households. In contrast, households that reported earnings
to both systems tended to have more members, be more likely to have
children, be younger, have lower levels of unearned income, and receive
lower proportions of their maximum food stamp allotments than other
households. Comparisons of the reported earnings amounts reveal that
these households reported about $130–$170 more in average monthly
earnings to their state’s UI systems than to the food stamp agencies. The
differences in these amounts might be consistent with states’ income
reporting requirements, but they could also reflect purposeful, unauthorized underreporting.
Households that reported earnings to their state’s food stamp agency
but that did not have reported earnings in their state’s UI system looked
similar in many respects to households with indications of earnings in
both systems. The principal differences between the two groups were
that households with no indications of earnings in the UI system tended
to be less likely to be black and to have lower reported earnings. In
Georgia and South Carolina, these households were also more likely to
be Hispanic and more likely to live in a border county. The differences
for Hispanics could be attributable to their overrepresentation in agricultural work and other uncovered jobs. The differences between residents in border and nonborder counties for Georgia and South Carolina
might reflect differences in the chances of working out of state.8
Households with reported earnings in their state’s UI systems but
with no earnings reported to food stamp agencies were less likely to be
married, more likely to be black, had higher average unearned incomes,
and received higher proportions of their maximum food stamp allotments than households that reported earnings. The average monthly
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earnings recorded in the UI system for these households was just over
$600 in each state, which was lower than the UI earnings for households that reported earnings to food stamp agencies. To put the figure
in perspective, it was the equivalent of just under three weeks of fulltime work at the then-prevailing federal minimum wage. Among households with UI earnings but no reported food stamp earnings, very high
proportions—48.2 percent in Georgia, 45.5 percent in Missouri, and
36.3 percent in South Carolina—also reported not having any unearned
income.
Table 2.4 reports average characteristics that condition on households’ income reporting behavior but not on other characteristics. We
have also estimated (but do not report detailed results from) multivariate unordered discrete choice (multinomial logit) models that account
for indirect associations among the measured characteristics. All the
simple differences described in the preceding text also appear in the
multivariate models.
As we did with the national FSPQC data, we can also compare
trends in food stamp households’ indicated work behavior based on their
reports to state food stamp agencies and based on records from the state
UI systems. Table 2.5 lists these results. Trends in the incidence and
monthly equivalent amounts of earnings are mostly similar for the data
reported to food stamp agencies and to the UI system, although there
are a few exceptions. For example, the incidence of earnings reported
to the Georgia Department of Human Services generally increased from
FY 2001 to 2007, while the incidence of earnings in the state’s UI system fell from FY 2001 to 2002 but increased thereafter. Comparisons
of the estimated incidence of earnings reported to food stamp agencies
from Table 2.2 and Table 2.5 further indicate that restricting the end-ofquarter administrative data to cases that participated in all three months
of the quarter and in the first month of the subsequent quarter does not
substantially alter the trends.
Table 2.5 also lists the average differences in the earnings amounts
reported to food stamp agencies and to the UI system first in terms
of monthly equivalents and second as a proportion of each household’s gross-income food stamp eligibility threshold (i.e., 130 percent
of the federal poverty line). In Georgia, the average differences in the
reported amounts are very modest, ranging from $27 to $45 in monthly
terms over the period. In Missouri and South Carolina, the differences

Table 2.4 Characteristics of Food Stamp Households Conditional on Earnings Reports
Georgia
No FS, FS and FS but UI but
no UI
UI
no UI no FS

Missouria
No FS, FS and FS but UI but
no UI
UI
no UI no FS

South Carolina
No FS, FS and FS but UI but
no UI
UI
no UI no FS
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Earnings report by source
Demographic characteristics
2.0
3.3
2.9
2.7
1.6
3.3
2.7
2.5
1.9
3.4
2.8
2.8
No. of people in household
% with children in HH
43.3
89.8
82.4
72.9
27.2
83.5
62.1
62.2
37.6
88.7
68.3
71.4
No. of children in HH
0.9
2.1
1.8
1.5
0.5
1.9
1.4
1.2
0.7
2.0
1.5
1.5
% with elderly members
19.6
1.2
2.6
3.9
28.7
1.3
6.6
4.1
29.1
1.4
4.1
4.3
% with married HH head
16.6
27.0
32.8
18.3
14.1
23.8
25.6
16.3
10.7
17.9
23.1
12.2
% with black HH head
59.9
67.6
48.5
72.9
29.7
28.2
21.7
42.2
62.9
70.8
53.7
71.5
% with Hisp. HH head
1.8
2.7
12.0
1.5
1.1
1.9
1.4
1.9
0.2
0.5
1.5
0.3
Household head’s age
44.9
32.6
34.2
35.7
49.0
32.1
37.7
35.5
48.7
33.2
37.1
35.6
10.1
11.6
11.2
11.4
HH head’s years of educ.
11.1
11.6
11.3
11.5
11.1
11.7
11.6
11.6
Economic characteristics
Monthly unearned income ($) 423
126
127
294
494
135
243
329
509
147
146
361
Mthly. earnings rep. to FS ($)
0
950
672
0
0
995
577
0
0
944
539
0
Monthly earn. rep. to UI ($)
0
1,082
0
602
0
1,164
0
601
0
1,097
0
632
% with no reported inc.
33.8
0.0
0.0
48.2
26.6
0.0
0.0
45.5
20.9
0.0
0.0
36.3
Area unemployment rate (%) 5.1
5.0
5.0
5.0
5.8
5.6
5.6
5.9
7.0
6.7
7.0
6.8
Border county (%)
26.7
28.3
29.2
23.7
66.4
63.0
60.2
72.5
42.7
38.9
44.9
40.9
Program characteristics
Monthly FS benefits ($)
213
275
291
314
157
276
264
289
183
267
285
318
Maximum FS allotment ($)
279
446
401
366
226
416
350
328
272
453
380
380
Monthly ben. as % of allot.
73.0
62.5
74.4
86.4
55.9
59.4
64.7
78.2
61.7
59.5
77.4
84.5
NOTE: FS = food stamps; UI = Unemployment Insurance; HH = household.
a
Data from Missouri only available from FY 2004–2007.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from end-of-quarter food stamp administrative records for households that received benefits for all three
months of the quarter and for the first month of the subsequent quarter matched to UI earnings records. All dollar estimates have been
adjusted for inflation to December 2007 values using the Consumer Price Index for Urban Consumers.

Fiscal year
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007

Percent of
Average monthly
households
amount of earnings
reporting earnings
reported to FS
to FS agency (%)
agency ($)
33
33
35
35
36
36
36

Percent of
households with
earnings in UI
system (%)

Average difference
Average difference between reported
Average monthly between amounts
amounts as a
amount of earnings
reported to FS
percentage of
reported in UI
agency and UI
gross-income elig.
threshold
system
systema
($)
(%)
(%)

279
280
305
304
313
313
313

Georgia
38
36
37
37
38
38
38

309
307
335
345
358
358
358

30
27
30
41
45
45
45

3
2
2
3
3
3
3

350
355
333
330

96
95
81
77

6
6
5
5

299
319

60
70

3
4

2004
2005
2006
2007

28
28
28
27

254
260
252
252

Missourib
37
37
35
34

2001
2002

28
28

240
248

South Carolina
35
36

36

Table 2.5 Trends in Earnings Reported to Food Stamp Agencies and UI System

2003
2004
2005
2006
2007

29
30
30
30
30

257
256
259
257
259

37
38
39
39
39

345
360
373
366
364

89
103
114
109
105

5
6
7
7
6

Differences in column may not equal the differences in previous columns due to rounding.
Data from Missouri only available from FY 2004–2007.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from end-of-quarter food stamp administrative records for households that received benefits for all three
months of the quarter and for the first month of the subsequent quarter matched to UI earnings records. All dollar estimates have been
adjusted for inflation to December 2007 values using the Consumer Price Index for Urban Consumers.

a

b
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between the reported amounts are more substantial, exceeding $100 in
monthly equivalent terms in South Carolina in several years. However,
when expressed as a proportion of the gross-income eligibility threshold, the differences in reported earnings are all very modest. In Georgia, the differences are only 2–3 percent of the gross-income threshold,
while in Missouri and South Carolina the differences range from 3 to
7 percent of the threshold. These differences suggest that the apparent
underreporting of earnings to state food stamp agencies has relatively
modest effects on eligibility and benefits.

IMPLICATIONS
In the subsequent chapters, we use longitudinal administrative data
from the Georgia, Missouri, and South Carolina Food Stamp Programs
to investigate how changes in work-related policies affect the length of
households’ food stamp participation spells and the timing of households’ exits from assistance. Administrative data have some advantages
for these purposes—they accurately record the start and stop dates of
spells, record all of the information available to the agencies and case
managers, and contain many more observations than are typically available in surveys. However, administrative data are also generally understood to have drawbacks, and the analyses in this chapter confirm that
some of these drawbacks are present in our data.
Representativeness
Because of confidentiality concerns and the sensitivity of the underlying information, special arrangements need to be made to work with
case record data. We were fortunate to be able to make such arrangements with state agencies in three states, which allows us to examine
policy changes in several contexts. However, we acknowledge that the
three states that we analyze are not representative of all states. Over the
period that we consider, food stamp households in Georgia, Missouri,
and South Carolina were similar to food stamp households across the
nation in terms of their sizes, reported earnings, and potential maximum
food stamp benefits. However, households in our analysis states were
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also poorer than households in the United States as a whole, owing
mainly to lower unearned incomes and less generous cash assistance
policies in the analysis states. Households in our analysis states were
less likely to have elderly members and less likely to be Hispanic. Also,
our two southern states—Georgia and South Carolina—had much
higher proportions of black households than the rest of the country.
In the empirical analyses in the subsequent chapters, we use multivariate statistical techniques that condition on observed characteristics of households, including their unearned incomes, age composition,
race, and ethnicity. Still the results should be interpreted as being representative of households in states with less generous cash assistance
programs and not necessarily of households with access to more generous programs.
Underreported Earnings
Administrative data precisely record households’ participation in
the Food Stamp Program, the benefits households received, the policy
conditions that they faced, and the information that served as the basis
for program outcomes. However, the data provide a much less accurate
picture of households’ work behavior and earnings.
All three of our analysis states computed households’ food stamp
eligibility and benefits for a given issue month on the basis of “prospective budgeting,” which means using income and resource amounts
that could be reasonably anticipated for the month. Households with
highly variable pay or hours and households with unanticipated earnings shocks would have received earnings that differed from those used
in the calculations and recorded in the administrative data. Each of the
states also adopted simplified income reporting procedures that meant
that some types of earnings increases did not have to be reported to food
stamp agencies during a household’s certification period. Beyond these
sanctioned reasons for reporting different incomes than were actually
received, households had incentives to conceal earnings from the food
stamp agencies.
We compared the earnings reported to the food stamp agencies to
the earnings reported to each state’s Unemployment Insurance system.
The UI systems are themselves incomplete and fail to record all the
income earned by households in each state. Despite this, the incidence
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and amounts of earnings recorded for our food stamp households in
the UI system were each higher than those recorded by the food stamp
agencies. For example, a quarter to a third of the food stamp households that we examined reported earnings to food stamp agencies, but
a further 12–14 percent with no earnings in the food stamp records had
reported earnings in the UI records. Depending on the state and year,
the average monthly value of earnings reported by households to food
stamp agencies was $30–$114 less than the amount recorded in the UI
system. Among households that reported no earnings to food stamp
authorities but that had reported earnings in the UI system, the average monthly value of those UI earnings exceeded $600. Thus, work
among food stamp households is more widespread and remunerative
than agencies’ records indicate.
The empirical analyses of participation outcomes in our subsequent
chapters will utilize only the earnings data reported to food stamp agencies. Although the UI earnings data are available, we do not include
them for two reasons. First, the data in the food stamp agency records
were the data that were used to set the policies that we are interested
in, including the length of recertification intervals and the applicability of ABAWD time limits. Second, the quarterly periodicity of the UI
earnings information is different from and difficult to align with the
monthly periodicity of the food stamp participation outcomes and data.
In interpreting the results, however, it is important to note the distinction between households’ reported and actual earnings behavior.

Notes
1. As discussed below, SNAP administrative practice records expected future earnings for use in calculating SNAP eligibility and benefits, so observed discrepancies may not be due to misreporting by participants.
2. The sources of countable unearned income are regular cash payments except for
earnings. These include cash transfers from other government programs, such as
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families benefits, Unemployment Insurance payments, Supplemental Security Income benefits, and Social Security retirement and
disability insurance payments. They also include private sources of income, such
as pensions, private disability payments, and child support. Countable income
does not include some irregular sources of income, such as Earned Income Tax
Credit payments. It also does not include other in-kind assistance, such as Medicaid or Medicare, energy assistance, school meals, or child care services.
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3. The exclusions for item nonresponse and for very young and very old household
heads reduce the analysis samples for each state by only a few percentage points.
4. The estimates that we report for the end-of-quarter months are similar to estimates
using all months.
5. As noted in Chapter 1, the FSPQC data exclude a modest number of cases, such
as households receiving disaster assistance and recipients facing case closures but
appealing those decisions. See U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition
Service, “Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program Participation and Costs.”
http://www.fns.usda.gov/sites/default/files/pd/SNAPsummary.pdf (accessed May
14, 2014).
6. In separate analyses not shown, we compared the administrative data for Georgia, Missouri, and South Carolina with the FSPQC data for those specific states
and confirmed that each data source provided similar estimates of household
characteristics.
7. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service, “Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program Quality Control.” http://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/qc/
(accessed May 14, 2014). Error rates beginning in FY 2003 can be found at http://
fns.usda.gov/snap/qc/ (accessed December 20, 2018).
8. We do not observe the same relationship in Missouri between residence in a border county and the incidence of UI earnings. Recall that UI earnings data are
available for people who work in Kansas. This would reduce the “border effect”
for Kansas City metropolitan area residents who are in Missouri counties on the
border with Kansas. In the case of the St. Louis metropolitan area, which is on the
Illinois border, job opportunities are much greater in the Missouri portion of the
metropolitan area, so relatively few Missouri residents commute across the border
to jobs in Illinois.

3
Food Stamp Recertification
Intervals and the Working Poor
We expect that the working poor would find the administrative
requirements for obtaining and maintaining SNAP eligibility to be particularly burdensome. Beyond the time and effort of pulling together
materials, the need to visit or call a state office at a specific time could
present an important obstacle. In addition, employed food stamp recipients are generally required to submit documents for recertification more
frequently than those without employment. For these reasons, recertification policies are particularly important for the working poor. This
chapter focuses on those policies and their variation over time in Georgia, Missouri, and South Carolina, documenting their role in inducing
attrition from the Food Stamp Program.
A household’s eligibility to participate in the Food Stamp Program is based on monthly criteria. In principle, the states that administer the Food Stamp Program could check these criteria every month
for every participating household and require the households to report
their incomes and assets and provide supporting documentation. Such
a policy would allow for highly accurate eligibility and benefits determinations, but it would also be terribly burdensome for the clients who
would have to provide the materials and costly for the states that would
have to process, review, and act on the information.
Instead of requiring this information every month, states certify
eligibility for most clients for several months—and in some cases up
to two years—at a time. During these certification periods, clients
receive food stamp benefits and generally do not have to report about
their household or financial circumstances unless there is some type of
relevant change. At the end of the certification period, the household
must have its eligibility for assistance recertified and its benefits redetermined. Recertification typically involves supplying the same information as in the original application. If the household fails to recertify,
its benefits are terminated.
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States are given some discretion in setting the length of certification
periods. States typically set longer certification periods for households
with incomes that come only from fixed sources, such as retirement and
disability payments, and in some cases welfare. The logic behind this
choice is that these sources of income either do not change much over
time (so there is nothing new to report) or are already tracked through
other state administrative systems (so eligibility can be confirmed automatically). States set shorter periods for households with earnings and
other sources of income that are more likely to fluctuate. While this distinction makes sense from a reporting and information standpoint, it has
the perverse practical effects of raising the costs of program compliance
for households with working members and discouraging participation
among these households. More frequent recertifications also increase
the risk that a household will be dropped from the program because
of carelessness or if an emergency or some other event interferes with
completing this task, which would also reduce participation among
working households. This chapter empirically examines whether the
lengths of recertification intervals influence food stamp participation
patterns and whether differences in those intervals explain some of the
difference in food stamp participation between working and nonworking households.
States differ in the ways in which they set certification periods.
Some states instruct caseworkers to assign periods that last up to a certain length but give caseworkers flexibility to set the period within that
length. This kind of flexibility can be helpful to clients who participate
in multiple assistance programs that also have certification periods; in
some circumstances, the caseworkers can schedule the ends of the certification periods for the different programs so that they fall on the same
date. Other states, including the three that we study, have had policies
where certification periods for particular types of clients must be a certain length. These policies confer an analytical advantage because all
clients of a given type are subject to recertification at regular, identifiable intervals.
Other studies have focused on the effects of recertification intervals.
A common approach in the empirical literature has been to use information on the difference in recertification intervals across states or type of
household within a state to examine how these are related to caseloads.
For example, Currie and Grogger (2001) investigate how the average
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frequency of recertifications in a state was associated with food stamp
receipt. They find that longer average intervals were associated with
higher rates of participation for most types of households but that few
of the estimates could be statistically distinguished from zero. Kornfeld (2002) also finds that recertification intervals were associated with
participation for some types of households, such as households with
multiple adults and children and childless households with nonelderly
members, but not others. Kabbani and Wilde (2003) find stronger evidence of participation effects, estimating that participation rates were
as much as 2.4 percent lower in states with short (monthly to quarterly)
recertification requirements than in states with longer certification
intervals. In contrast, Ratcliffe, McKernan, and Finegold (2008) find
much less consistent evidence. They report that longer recertification
intervals were associated with increased participation for households
with children but decreased participation for able-bodied adults without
dependents (ABAWDs).
Other research has examined how recertification affects the timing
of families’ exits from the Food Stamp Program. Staveley, Stevens, and
Wilde (2002) conduct a descriptive analysis of administrative data from
Maryland and find that program exits were clustered at likely recertification dates. Ribar, Edelhoch, and Liu (2008) provide descriptive evidence and estimate multivariate models using administrative data from
South Carolina and find similar results. Gray (2018) also shows that
attrition from Michigan’s Food Stamp Program over the period 2005–
2011 occurred disproportionately in months when recertification was
required. His analyses in six other states for 2011–2012 find essentially
the same pattern of attrition.
In this chapter, we follow the approach of these latter studies and
take advantage of the regularities in recertification policies to examine
how the length of certification periods affects the length of time that
households remain on the Food Stamp Program. We use case records
for households with working-age members from Georgia, Missouri,
and South Carolina that provide information on the duration of program spells, and we empirically examine how the timing of program
exits relates to the timing of recertification dates. Our analyses reveal
that households were several times more likely to leave the Food Stamp
Program when recertifications were due than at other times. The analyses also show that shorter recertification intervals, which were com-
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monly assigned to working households, were associated with shorter
program spells.

RECERTIFICATION POLICIES IN GEORGIA, MISSOURI,
AND SOUTH CAROLINA
Table 3.1 summarizes the recertification policies from 2001 through
2007 for Georgia, Missouri, and South Carolina. All three states had
different recertification policies for different types of households, and
all three also changed their policies over the period that we study.
Georgia’s recertification policies are listed in the first row of Table
3.1. Prior to October 2002, Georgia required all nonelderly, nondisabled
food stamp participants to recertify every 3 months and households
with elderly or disabled members (and presumably fixed incomes) to
recertify every 12 months. Starting in October 2002, the state increased
the recertification intervals for nonelderly, nondisabled, non-ABAWD
households to 6 months, but maintained the quarterly intervals for
ABAWD households and the annual intervals for households with
elderly and disabled members.
Missouri and South Carolina also set different recertification intervals for different types of food stamp households. In Missouri, most
households without elderly and disabled members were initially
required to recertify every three months; however, beginning in April
2003, the recertification intervals increased to six months. Households
with nonworking elderly and disabled members had the same formal
certification periods but could be recertified with much less information
for up to 24 months. Missouri also set very short recertification intervals, ranging from 1 to 3 months, for households with very unstable
circumstances, such as households with migrant workers.
South Carolina initially set recertification intervals of 3 months for
households with fluctuating incomes and recertification intervals of 12
months for households with fixed sources of income. As with Missouri,
South Carolina also had relaxed recertification requirements for households with nonworking elderly and disabled members and set very
short intervals for households with unusually unstable circumstances.
In October 2002, South Carolina increased the recertification interval

Table 3.1 Recertification Policies in Georgia, Missouri, and South Carolina, FY 2001–2007
State
Georgia

Missouri

Households
with earnings
Before Oct. 2002:
3 months
After Oct. 2002:
6 months
Before Apr. 2003:
3 months
After Apr. 2003:
6 months

South Carolina Before Oct. 2002:
3 months
After Oct. 2002:
6 months

Households
Able-bodied adults Elderly and disabled,
without earnings without dependents
no earnings
Before Oct. 2002: 3 months
12 months
3 months
After Oct. 2002:
6 months

Other circumstances
(e.g., migrant
workers)

Before Apr. 2003:
3 months
After Apr. 2003:
6 months

Treated like other
households

Treated like other
households but
with less formal
reporting for up
to 24 months

1–3 months

Before Feb. 2005:
12 months
After Feb. 2005:
6 months

Treated like other
households

Treated like other
households but
with less formal
reporting for up
to 24 months

1–2 months
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for households with fluctuating incomes from 3 months to 6 months,
and in February 2005, the state reduced the recertification interval for
households that relied solely on unearned income from 12 to 6 months.
In all three states, the increases in recertification intervals from 3
to 6 months would be expected to increase the length of food stamp
spells and contribute to an increase in the food stamp caseload, other
things held constant. In South Carolina, the decrease in recertification
intervals from 12 to 6 months in 2005 for households without earnings
would be expected to shorten food stamp spells and reduce the caseload for that group. Also, the shorter recertification intervals for households with earned income is expected to reduce spell lengths and reduce
program participation for working households relative to nonworking
households.

EMPIRICAL APPROACH
Analysis Data
As we describe in the previous chapter, we use the administrative
data from Georgia, Missouri, and South Carolina to form state-specific
analysis files that each contain one observation per household per
month of food stamp benefit receipt. These observations include information about the household’s program benefits, its earned and unearned
income, its composition, its head’s characteristics, and its economic and
geographic circumstances each month.
For the empirical analyses in this chapter, we further organize these
monthly observations into participation spells, which consist of months
of consecutive food stamp receipt. For each monthly observation within
a spell, we measure the duration, which describes the number of months
since the spell began. We distinguish between spells that are observed
to their end and for which we observe an exit and “right-censored”
spells, which are not observed to their end because they were ongoing
when our observation window closed at the end of FY 2007 or were
on-going when we stopped tracking the household because of missing
information. We also drop “left-censored” spells, which were ongoing
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when our observation window began and for which we cannot determine spell durations.
In the data, a substantial number of participation spells last one
month. Many of these spells are for households that temporarily received
food stamp benefits while their applications were being considered but
that were subsequently determined to be ineligible for assistance. There
are also many participation spells that are separated by a single month
of nonparticipation. This frequently occurs when a household misses
its recertification but upon losing its benefits immediately completes
its recertification and resumes its participation spell. As is customary
in event-history analyses of public assistance spells (see, e.g., Blank
and Ruggles [1996]; Gleason, Schochet, and Moffitt [1998]; and Ribar,
Edelhoch, and Liu [2008]), we smooth the data by dropping one-month
participation spells and by eliminating one-month breaks in participation spells.
We drop spells for food stamp households in which all the members
were elderly because the incidence of work for these households was
miniscule. In all our analyses we also distinguish between households
with and without children, owing to the differences in work behavior,
some program rules, and the availability of other types of assistance for
these groups.
Estimation Approach
The statistical approach that we use to examine the effects of recertification policies on food stamp participation is discrete-time hazard
analysis (see Alison [1982] for a thorough technical description). In
general, hazard analyses are used to examine the length of time that
someone spends in one condition before transitioning to some other
condition. In our case, we use the approach to investigate the length of
time that a household receives food stamps from the month it begins
receiving benefits until the month it stops receiving benefits. The analysis is framed in terms of discrete-time hazards, which are the probabilities of transitioning out of the initial status (leaving food stamps) conditional on having been in that status (receiving food stamps) up to that
point. Hazard methods were originally developed to study mortality,
and an example from that is the probability that someone dies at age 70
conditional on the person living to age 70.1
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The term discrete-time refers to the fact that the time in the condition is measured in countable (integer) units. Food stamp benefits in the
three states in our study were generally issued monthly. Thus, we count
people as participating in the Food Stamp Program if they received benefits in a given month, and we record the length of their participation
spells in terms of the number of months that they received benefits.
A key advantage of hazard analyses is that they show how people’s chances of leaving the Food Stamp Program change with each
month spent on the program. Thus, the analysis can show months when
people are very likely to leave. This is extraordinarily helpful in looking at recertification policies because they are tied to specific months
of program experience. For example, someone who is subject to quarterly recertifications would encounter this policy at the end of the third
month on the program, sixth month on the program, ninth month, and
so on, but not in other months. If recertifications (distinct from other
events) cause some people to leave the Food Stamp Program, we would
expect to see elevated hazard probabilities in these specific months.
We conduct descriptive and multivariate analyses. In the descriptive analyses, we calculate Kaplan-Meier hazard estimates for each
month of the food stamp spell, providing the observed probability that
individuals exit SNAP conditional on receiving SNAP up to that point,
comparing people who begin their spells with and without earnings in
each state under different recertification regimes. In addition, we estimate multivariate models that also examine the relationship between
program exits and recertification policies but that control for household
characteristics, economic conditions, and other observed measures.
The estimated hazard probabilities can also be used to calculate the
probabilities that spells will continue past specified dates; statisticians
call these survival probabilities. Thus, we can form distributions of the
probabilities that spells will last at least one month, at least two months,
at least three months, and so on.2 From these distributions, we can calculate the median spell length (the spell duration by which half of the
recipients will have exited and half of the recipients will remain on the
program). In the analyses that follow, we also examine how median
spell lengths in the states change with recertification policies and other
household characteristics.
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DESCRIPTIVE RESULTS
Timing of Exits
Figure 3.1 contains four panels depicting Kaplan-Meier estimates
of the monthly hazard probabilities of leaving the Food Stamp Program over the first 30 months of participation spells for different groups
of households in Georgia. The first two panels show estimated hazard probabilities for households that include children, while the next
two panels show estimated hazard probabilities for childless households with nonelderly (working-age) adults. The panels are further
organized by the dates when the households entered the Food Stamp
Program. The first and third panels show estimates for the cohort of
households that entered before October 2002—that is, during the period
when Georgia required quarterly recertifications for most nonelderly,
nondisabled households. The second and fourth panels show estimates
from the cohort of households that entered on or after October 2002,
when the state switched to semiannual recertifications for non-ABAWD
households.
The sawtooth pattern in the hazard estimates indicates that the timing of Food Stamp Program exits in Georgia was strongly related to the
timing of recertifications. Among food stamp households with children,
exits were several times more likely to occur at quarterly recertification
dates prior to October 2002. After October 2002, the quarterly spikes
disappeared, and households were instead much more likely to leave
at semiannual intervals. Among childless, nonelderly households there
was also a substantially higher probability of leaving the Food Stamp
Program at quarterly intervals prior to October 2002. After October
2002, there continued to be high probabilities of exiting the program
at quarterly and semiannual intervals, though the semiannual spikes
became relatively larger. The estimates after October 2002 for childless, nonelderly households are consistent with this group containing a
mix of ABAWD households, who would have been subject to quarterly
recertifications, and non-ABAWD households (e.g., households with
disabled members or members between 50 and 60 years of age), who
would have been subject to semiannual recertifications. Taken together,
the estimates from Figure 3.1 provide very strong evidence that Geor-
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Figure 3.1 Estimated Food Stamp Program Exit Hazard Probabilities
for Georgia
Georgia households with children that began spells before October 2002
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Georgia households with children that began spells on or after October 2002
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Figure 3.1 (continued)
Georgia households without children that began spells before October 2002
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Georgia households without children that began spells on or after October 2002
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SOURCE: Authors’ calculations of Kaplan-Meier hazard probabilities from Georgia
administrative data.
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gia’s recertification policies influenced food stamp households’ participation behavior through the timing of exits.
In Figure 3.2, we conduct a similar analysis for food stamp
households in Missouri. As with the previous figure, Figure 3.2
shows Kaplan-Meier hazard estimates for households with children
first and nonelderly households without children next. Monthly data
on food stamp spells in Missouri were only available starting in FY
2004, so the panels show estimates for households that entered the
state’s Food Stamp Program after it had adopted longer recertification intervals and most households were subject to semiannual
recertifications.
Food stamp households’ exit behavior in Missouri exhibited the
sawtooth pattern that we observed in Georgia. Specifically, households
were much more likely to leave the program at semiannual intervals but
not in other periods, which was consistent with the recertification policy
that was in effect at the time.
Figure 3.3 shows Kaplan-Meier hazard probabilities estimated for
households with children and nonelderly households without children
who entered the Food Stamp Program in South Carolina during three
different time intervals: October 2000–March 2001, July 2002–December 2002, and April 2005–September 2005. These time intervals correspond to the three different recertification policy periods in South
Carolina.
South Carolina’s initial recertification policies differed from those
of the other two states because South Carolina distinguished between
households with fluctuating and fixed incomes. In the first and fourth
panels, South Carolina households were more likely to leave the Food
Stamp Program at quarterly and annual intervals. The quarterly exit
patterns were stronger for households that entered the Food Stamp
Program with earnings, while the annual exit patterns were stronger
for households that entered without earnings. The differences between
households with and without earnings were especially pronounced for
childless households (fourth panel).
After October 2002, South Carolina changed its recertification
intervals for households with fluctuating incomes from three to six
months. The second and fifth panels, which show estimates for households that entered the Food Stamp Program during this period, indicate
that households were more likely to leave the program at semiannual
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Figure 3.2 Estimated Food Stamp Program Exit Hazard Probabilities
for Missouri
Missouri households with children that began spells on or after October 2003
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Missouri households without children that began spells on or after October 2003
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SOURCE: Authors’ calculations of Kaplan-Meier hazard probabilities from Missouri
administrative data.
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Figure 3.3 Estimated Food Stamp Program Exit Hazard Probabilities
for South Carolina
South Carolina households with children that began spells between Oct. 2000 and Mar. 2001
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South Carolina households with children that began spells between Jul. 2002 and Dec. 2002
0.35

No earnings

0.30

Earnings

0.25
0.20
0.15
0.10
0.05
0.00

1

4

7

10

13

16
Months

19

22

25

28

South Carolina households with children that began spells between Apr. 2005 and Sep. 2005
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Figure 3.3 (continued)
South Carolina households without children that began spells between Oct. 2000 and Mar. 2001
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South Carolina households without children that began spells between Jul. 2002 and Dec. 2002
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South Carolina households without children that began spells between Apr. 2005 and Sep. 2005
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SOURCE: Authors’ calculations of Kaplan-Meier hazard probabilities from South
Carolina administrative data.
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and annual intervals. Once again, households with earnings were more
likely to leave at semiannual intervals, while households without earnings were more likely to leave at annual intervals.
South Carolina changed its recertification policies again in February 2005, setting a uniform 6-month interval for most nonelderly households. The estimates from the third and sixth panels of Figure 3.3 show
a semiannual exit pattern with little discernible difference between
households with and without earnings.
Lengths of Participation Spells
We use the hazard estimates from Figures 3.1–3.3 to calculate the
median food stamp participation spell lengths for the different types of
households in each entry cohort in each state. The estimated median
spell lengths are reported in Table 3.2. The left two columns of numbers
show median spell lengths for households with children conditional on
those households beginning their food stamp spells with no earnings
and with earnings. The right two columns of numbers show median
spell lengths for nonelderly childless households with no earnings and
with earnings.
The estimates from Table 3.2 reveal that median food stamp spell
lengths were generally shorter for nonelderly childless households than
for households with children. In Georgia and Missouri, the median spell
lengths for nonelderly childless households were all close to 7 months
regardless of earnings status or the recertification policy, while the
median spell lengths for households with children varied more, ranging
from 9.0 to 12.1 months. Median spell lengths were even more variable
in South Carolina, ranging from 6.2 to 12.9 months for nonelderly childless households and 9.5 to 14.5 months for households with children.
Among households with children in Georgia and Missouri and
among all nonelderly households in South Carolina, longer recertification intervals appear to have increased median food stamp participation
spells. The direct effect of the policy is shown when states switched
from quarterly to semiannual recertifications and the median spell
lengths for these groups increased by two to three months. When South
Carolina subsequently reduced its recertification interval for households with fixed incomes from 12 to 6 months, median spell lengths for
households without earnings in that state fell.
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Table 3.2 Estimated Median Food Stamp Spell Lengths
Households
Nonelderly childless
with children
households
No
No
State/entry cohort
earnings Earnings earnings Earnings
Georgia
7.7
6.2
10.0
9.0
Began spells before Oct. 2002
7.0
6.8
11.6
11.7
Began spells on or after Oct.
2003
Missouri
11.3
12.1
7.1
6.8
Began spells on or after Oct.
2003
South Carolina
12.4
9.5
10.0
6.2
Began spells between Oct.
2000 and Mar. 2001
12.9
12.0
14.5
12.6
Began spells between July
2003 and Dec. 2004
12.6
12.2
Began spells between April
12.6
12.9
2005 and Sep. 2005
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations of median spell lengths in months from Kaplan-Meier
hazard probabilities from Georgia, Missouri, and South Carolina administrative data.

More evidence for an association between recertification intervals and spell lengths comes from comparisons of households with
and without earnings. Georgia and Missouri set the same recertification intervals for these two groups, and the median spell lengths for the
groups were very similar. Prior to February 2005, South Carolina set
shorter recertification intervals for households with fluctuating incomes
than for households with fixed incomes, and median spell lengths were
shorter for households with earnings than for households without. After
February 2005, South Carolina adopted similar 6-month recertification
intervals for both groups, and the differences in the groups’ median
spell lengths narrowed.
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MULTIVARIATE RESULTS
Estimates of spell duration patterns, like the patterns shown in Figures 3.1–3.3, can be confounded by other unmeasured characteristics.
For example, failing to account for general characteristics that might
make households more or less likely to leave the Food Stamp Program,
such as earnings ability or local economic conditions, can lead to a spurious negative relationship between duration and the hazard of leaving
the Food Stamp Program.3 So it is important to also obtain estimates of
these patterns using multivariate statistical methods that can account for
observed characteristics.
For each state, we estimate discrete-time logistic hazard models
that include separate flexible (monthly dummy variable) controls for
the duration patterns for households that began their food stamp spells
with and without earnings in each recertification policy period. For
example, in Georgia we estimate models with separate flexible duration
pattern controls for households that entered before October 2002 with
earnings, households that entered before October 2002 without earnings, households that entered on or after October 2002 with earnings,
and households that entered on or after October 2002 without earnings.
These models also include controls for the household’s food stamp benefit level, earned income, unearned income, zero-income status, number of members, and number of children; the household head’s age,
education, race, and marital status; the age of the youngest member; the
presence of any elderly members (only for households with children);
the unemployment rate in the county of residence; and general controls (dummy variables) for each fiscal year. The models are estimated
separately for households with children and for nonelderly households
without children.
To show the adjusted duration pattern from these models, we take
the estimated model coefficients for a state and type of household (with
children or nonelderly without children) and apply them to every household observation of the same type in that state to form predictions of
the hazard rates. The predictions assume that the households entered the
Food Stamp Program on particular dates (for example, in October 2000
and October 2002 for Georgia) and that the households maintained the
same observed characteristics as their first month on the program.4 Con-
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ditioning in this way approximates the distribution of population characteristics over the entire sample period. Predicted hazard rates from
this procedure for Georgia, Missouri, and South Carolina are shown in
Figures 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6, respectively.
The regression- and population-adjusted estimates of the food stamp
participation spell hazard rates in Figures 3.4–3.6 are all very similar
to the corresponding unadjusted estimates from Figures 3.1–3.3. For
Georgia, the quarterly spikes in the exit rates in the initial policy period
are replicated, while the semiannual spikes for all households and the
smaller quarterly spikes for nonelderly childless households in the later
period are also captured. For Missouri, the strong semiannual sawtooth
patterns of exits in the later policy period are reproduced. Likewise, for
South Carolina, all the exit patterns across household types, earnings
status, and recertification policy periods are reproduced. Overall, the
estimates from Figures 3.4–3.6 indicate that our findings of associations
between the timing of food stamp exits and likely recertification dates
are robust to controls for other observed characteristics.
We do not have data on reasons for attrition for all our three states.
Ribar and Edelhoch (2008) examine the reasons for exit in South Carolina among households with children and find that just over half the
exits occur because of missed recertifications and another sixth occur
for administrative reasons such as failing to provide information. Gray
(2018) reports that for Idaho in 2011 in more than three quarters of the
cases where attrition occurs at a recertification deadline, exit from the
Food Stamp Program is listed as being due to the missed deadline. In
contrast, in other months, loss of eligibility is the primary factor, listed
for up to 90 percent of the exits.

CONCLUSION
Periodic recertification in the Food Stamp Program represents a necessary compromise between two competing policy objectives. On the
one hand, states need accurate information to determine whether households remain eligible for the program and what participating households’ benefits should be. On the other hand, supplying and processing
information imposes real costs on households and the state agencies.
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Figure 3.4 Regression- and Population-Adjusted Food Stamp Program
Exit Hazard Probabilities for Georgia
Georgia households with children simulated to begin spells in October 2000
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Georgia households with children simulated to begin spells in October 2002
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Figure 3.4 (continued)
Georgia households without children simulated to begin spells in October 2000
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Georgia households without children simulated to begin spells in October 2002
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SOURCE: Authors’ calculations of hazard probabilities obtained by applying coefficients from multivariate, discrete-time hazard models of food stamp exits estimated
using Georgia administrative data to first-month observations from all observed spells
in those data and assuming the specified start months.

64 Mueser, Ribar, and Tekin
Figure 3.5 Regression- and Population-Adjusted Food Stamp Program
Exit Hazard Probabilities for Missouri
Missouri households with children simulated to begin spells in October 2003
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Missouri households without children simulated to begin spells in October 2003
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SOURCE: Authors’ calculations of hazard probabilities obtained by applying coefficients from multivariate, discrete-time hazard models of food stamp exits estimated
using Missouri administrative data to first-month observations from all observed
spells in those data and assuming the specified start months.
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States want to minimize these costs so that they do not discourage program participation or waste administrative resources.5
This chapter has examined data on the duration of food stamp participation spells from the administrative systems for Georgia, Missouri,
and South Carolina using descriptive and multivariate event-history
methods and compared the timing of households’ exits from these spells
to the timing of likely recertification dates. The analyses provide strong
evidence that households are substantially more likely to leave the Food
Stamp Program in months when they face recertifications than in other
months. There is also evidence that longer intervals between recertifications are associated with longer spells of food stamp participation. The
positive association between the lengths of recertification intervals and
spell lengths, in turn, almost certainly contributes to higher caseload
levels because there is no reason to believe longer recertification intervals reduce new program entry. The longer intervals reduce flows out of
the program but do not reduce the flows into the program.
The evidence regarding the association of exit timing and recertification intervals is strong in several respects. First, in every analysis that we conduct, the probabilities of households exiting the Food
Stamp Program are two to three times higher in likely recertification
months than in the preceding or following months. Among the three
states that we examine, we were able to compare six different policy
regimes (two for Georgia, one for Missouri, and three for South Carolina). The substantial increases in exit probabilities in likely recertification months appear in every one of these regimes. Also, all three states
increased their recertification intervals from three months to six months
for at least some identifiable groups over this period. When the intervals
increased for the two states that we could examine, the spikes in exit
behavior at three months completely disappeared. To borrow a metaphor from Sherlock Holmes, the quarterly spikes that do not appear
during these semiannual policy periods are the dogs that do not bark.
Second, our findings are robust across states and across household
types within those states. In all our analyses, we report results separately
for households with children and nonelderly households without children. Within these groups we also report results separately for households that began their food stamp spells with and without earnings. The
patterns of exit timing for these groups match when the groups face the
same recertification policy and differ when they face different policies.
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Figure 3.6 Regression- and Population-Adjusted Food Stamp Program
Exit Hazard Probabilities for South Carolina
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South Carolina households with children simulated to begin spells in March 2005
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Figure 3.6 (continued)
South Carolina households without children simulated to begin spells in October 2000
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South Carolina households without children simulated to begin spells in October 2002
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South Carolina households without children simulated to begin spells in March 2005
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SOURCE: Authors’ calculations of hazard probabilities obtained by applying coefficients from
multivariate, discrete-time hazard models of food stamp exits estimated using South Carolina
administrative data to first-month observations from all observed spells in those data and assuming the specified start months.
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Third, our results are robust to the inclusion of multivariate controls
for other observed characteristics of the households, relevant program
variables, local economic conditions, and time trends.
One of the states that we study, South Carolina, initially set shorter
recertification intervals for working households than for other households, and all our states set either shorter recertification intervals or
stricter recertification procedures for households with working-age,
work-able members than for households with elderly or disabled members. The results from our analyses indicate that these policies reduce
food stamp spell lengths among working or work-able households relative to other households. Thus, these administrative procedures could
account for some of the differences in food stamp participation between
working families and other households. The more onerous administrative procedures for working families could also have the unintended
consequence of discouraging work.
Our analyses lead to many strong positive findings in the sense we
can conclude that the lengths of recertification intervals influence the
timing of food stamp exits and the duration of food stamp spells. However, it is much harder to draw normative findings from this evidence in
the sense of saying whether these relationships are good or bad. Shorter
recertification periods could be reducing the amount of time that ineligible households remain on the program and continue to receive benefits. However, the shorter periods could also be creating administrative
obstacles to program participation that discourage needy households,
and especially poor working households, from continuing their participation spells.

Notes
1. Formally, the discrete hazard is a conditional probability. We will refer to it simply
as a hazard or probability in what follows. For small values it is the same as the
continuous time hazard evaluated over the relevant period.
2. Let T be a random variable that denotes the possible spell length, and let t be a
particular spell duration. The survival probability is S(t) = Prob(T ≥ t), and the
hazard probability is λ(t) = Prob(T = t | T ≥ t). Then S(t) = (1- λ(1)) · (1 − λ(2)) · … ·
(1 − λ(t−1)).
3. If some individuals are more likely to leave food stamps at all times, such individuals will tend to exit earlier in a spell, causing the observed empirical hazard of
leaving food stamps to decline. It will therefore appear that the hazard of leaving
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declines over time, even if the hazard remains unchanged for any one individual
(Heckman 1981).
4. We have program, household, and economic characteristics observed in the first
month for every household in our administrative samples. We cannot control
for changes in these characteristics that individuals experience in later months
because some households leave the Food Stamp Program, and we are not able to
observe them after that.
5. See Prell (2008) and Pei (2017), who develop formal models for the decision of
how often to require recertification in social programs. Prell concludes that the
optimal period for the WIC program is between 7 and 14 months, and Pei concludes that the optimum for Medicaid/CHIP is at least 12 months. Both are longer
than common recertificaton periods for these programs.

4
Time Limits on Able-Bodied
Adults without Dependents
Means-testing of eligibility and benefits in public assistance programs, including the Food Stamp Program, creates potential disincentives to work. If people value both consumption and the time that they
spend outside the labor market, a transfer of assistance from the government allows them to increase both consumption and nonmarket time,
with the increase in nonmarket time translating to a decrease in market
work. Economists refer to this work disincentive as the income effect.
Means-testing also reduces benefits by some proportion as people’s
incomes, including their income from earnings, increase. This reduces
the marginal value of work and effectively serves as a wage decrease,
creating a substitution effect that further reduces the incentives to work.
Because of these reinforcing income and substitution effects, people are
expected to work less (or possibly not work at all) when means-tested
assistance is offered.1
The work disincentives of public assistance programs create a
conundrum for policymakers. On the one hand, food stamps and other
types of public assistance alleviate some of the worst hardships associated with poverty. In the case of food stamps, the benefits may mean
the difference between someone eating and going hungry. On the other
hand, insofar as public assistance discourages work, it undermines economic self-sufficiency and increases people’s dependence on the programs. Absent other changes in opportunities or people’s behavior, the
programs can create a “poverty trap” in which people are stuck on assistance for a long time.
One way to overcome these work disincentives and break out of
this trap is for public assistance programs to require people with the
capacity for employment to work or participate in other activities, such
as schooling or job training, that are consistent with eventual economic
self-sufficiency. Work requirements have long been a feature of cash
assistance programs in the United States. Less well known is that the
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Food Stamp Program has also had a history of work requirements and
work readiness requirements, for at least some recipients.
Botsko et al. (2001) review some of this history. Since the early
1970s, the Food Stamp Program has required working-age adults who
are not in school or caring for others to accept suitable employment if
it is offered to them. Over time, the proportion of food stamp recipients
who were subject to work requirements increased, and the requirements
themselves became more stringent. Legislation in 1985 required states
to create Employment and Training (E&T) programs and to meet certain performance thresholds. Recipients who failed to comply with the
E&T requirements and could not show “good cause” faced sanctions
that ranged from a temporary suspension of benefits to a permanent
disqualification from the program.
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act (PRWORA) of 1996 created a much tougher set of work requirements. The PRWORA mandated that able-bodied adults without dependents (ABAWDs), who were defined as people aged 18–49 who were
not disabled or caring for a child or disabled family member, had to
either work or participate in some other qualifying activity for at least
20 hours per week. ABAWDs who failed to meet this requirement faced
a time limit on the receipt of food stamp benefits of three months in a
given three-year period. The work and qualifying activity requirements
were much more onerous than those under the E&T programs, and the
short time limit was much stricter than the earlier sanction policy. The
E&T requirements remained in place for other food stamp recipients,
such as parents of older children.
The PRWORA allowed states, at their discretion but subject to
approval from the USDA, to waive the work requirements for ABAWDs
living in areas that were suffering from high unemployment, which was
subsequently defined as an unemployment rate in excess of 10 percent
or designation as a labor surplus area by the U.S. Department Labor.2
A year later, the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 further allowed states to
apply for exemptions from the work requirements and time limits for
up to 15 percent of their ABAWD caseloads. The intention behind these
waiver and exemption provisions was that it would be unfair to require
work in areas where jobs would be difficult to find.
Waivers and exemptions to the ABAWD work requirements were
requested by the states and approved by the USDA on a year-by-year
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basis. This meant that different areas within the requesting states were
covered at different times, leading not only to geographic variation in
the rules but also to time-series variation for particular areas. Over the
period 2001–2007, Georgia, Missouri, and South Carolina each sought
and obtained this type of relief. Table 4.1 shows the number of counties
affected by waivers and exemptions in the states as of January 1 of each
study year.
In Georgia, 45–61 of 159 counties were fully or partially affected in
any given year. Georgia applied for and obtained high unemployment
and labor surplus waivers for many entire counties, as well as for some
cities.
The variation in waivers and exemptions for Missouri was even
larger. Missouri’s ABAWD waivers were initially applied very selectively—prior to August 2000, of 115 county units, only 26 counties
and the city of St. Louis had waivers, and in 2001 the number of areas
with waivers fell to 21.3 However, beginning in August 2001, Missouri started using a less restrictive definition of labor surplus, which
resulted in waivers for 10 more counties, and in November 2001, the
state obtained a 15 percent exemption for 38 additional counties based
Table 4.1 Counties with Waivers or Exemptions from ABAWD
Time Limits
Georgia
Missouri
South Carolina
(159 counties)
(115 areasa)
(46 counties)
Year
All
Portions
All
Portions
All
Portions
2001
55
(6)
27
–
24
–
2002
50
(5)
69
–
25
–
2003
51
(4)
70
–
46
–
2004
48
(11)
82
–
46
–
2005
41
(12)
103
–
46
–
2006
42
(10)
105
–
46
–
2007
43
(2)
38
–
46
–
Missouri has 114 counties and one independent city (St. Louis).
NOTE: The table lists counts of affected counties as of January in the year shown in the
left column. The “all” column lists the number of counties in which the entire county
was exempted or waived; the “portion” column lists the number of counties in which
a city was exempted or waived but other portions of the county were not.
SOURCE: State agencies overseeing Food Stamp Program.
a
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solely on their small populations, rather than their economic circumstances. As part of the same 15 percent exemption, Missouri effectively
extended the time limit for ABAWDs living in larger counties to six
months. The number of areas in Missouri with waivers or exemptions
grew over the next few years until it reached 105 by January 2006. In
2007, however, the number fell substantially to just 38 areas.
South Carolina followed a different approach. In 2001 and early
2002, the state obtained exemptions or waivers for just over half of its
counties. Beginning in October 2002, however, it obtained a special
waiver from the USDA to treat the entire state—all 46 counties—as a
single labor surplus area. Thus, from October 2002 until the end of our
study period, all ABAWDs in South Carolina were effectively exempted
from the time limits and work rules.
In this chapter, we use administrative data on Food Stamp Program
spells from Georgia, Missouri, and South Carolina to compare the food
stamp exit behavior of households that lived in areas with ABAWD
time limits to households that lived in areas with exemptions and waivers to the time limits. We focus on households without children and
without elderly members, as these were the households that were most
likely to contain ABAWDs. However, for purposes of comparison, we
also examine the exit behavior of households with children (some of
these also contained ABAWD members) and households with only
elderly members (these would not have contained ABAWD members).
Our expectation entering this analysis is that food stamp recipients who
were subject to the work requirements and time limits would have been
more likely to leave the Food Stamp Program than recipients who were
not subject to the requirements, especially during the first few months
of their participation spells.

PREVIOUS RESEARCH
Although food stamp participation and caseload outcomes for
ABAWDs have been examined in many studies, including Bartlett et
al. (2004); Currie and Grogger (2001); Farrell et al. (2003); Gleason,
Schochet, and Moffitt (1998); and Kornfeld (2002), the specific effects
of time limits and work rules for ABAWDs have been considered by
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only a handful of studies. In an early study, Stravrianos and Nixon (1998)
use data on ABAWDs’ employment and food stamp participation patterns that were collected prior to the passage of the PRWORA to predict
how many ABAWDs might be affected by the time limits. They forecast
that very few ABAWDs would be able to meet the work requirements
and that a large proportion would lose eligibility. A descriptive analysis
by Czajka et al. (2001) reports on the numbers of ABAWDs who were
dropped from the Food Stamp Program and appears to confirm these
fears. Neither of these studies provides causal evidence of an impact of
the requirements.
Several studies examine how the overall food stamp caseloads
in states responded to the ABAWD policies, using the percentage of
ABAWDs in each state who were exempt from the time limits as a
measure of these policies. The results from these studies are equivocal. Wilde et al. (2000) and Ziliak, Gundersen, and Figlio (2003) find
that these exemption measures were associated with higher caseloads,
while Danielson and Klerman (2006) find that the measures were not
significantly associated with caseloads. All three studies suffer from
weak research designs. First, the studies examine aggregate food stamp
caseloads rather than the ABAWD caseload specifically. Because of the
modest number of ABAWDs in the overall caseload, we would expect
that this would substantially dilute any estimated effect of time limit
policies. Second, the statewide measure of the percentage of ABAWDs
exempt from time limits only captures the probability of a person being
exempt. This is a much cruder policy measure than someone’s actual
exemption status.
Ribar, Edelhoch, and Liu (2010) report stronger evidence of
ABAWD policy effects. They examine the timing of exits from Food
Stamp Program spells among adult-only households, using administrative data from South Carolina. They find that program spells were
shorter for households with likely ABAWD members living in counties
with time limits and work rules than for similar households living in
counties with exemptions or waivers to those rules. The researchers
also distinguish between exits that were and were not associated with
employment and find that the time limits and work rules increased both
types of exits. Thus, while the work requirements were associated with
greater economic self-sufficiency for some ABAWDs, they appeared to
increase hardships for others. In this chapter, we extend the analysis of
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program exits by Ribar et al., which was limited to South Carolina, to
also investigate data from Georgia and Missouri.

DESCRIPTIVE EVIDENCE
To examine the relationship between ABAWD work requirements
and people’s food stamp participation behavior, we use administrative
data on participation spells and follow the empirical approach from
the previous chapter to estimate monthly Kaplan-Meier hazard probabilities for groups that were likely to face different work requirements.
Specifically, we estimate hazard probabilities for three different, mutually exclusive types of households: childless nonelderly households,
households with children, and households with only elderly members.
The first group—childless nonelderly households—consists of
people aged 18–49, which conforms with the ABAWD age range. The
age range for this group differs from the nonelderly age range used
in the previous chapter (18–59).4 With these age restrictions and with
the absence of children, this group includes households with ABAWDs,
but it also includes households with nonelderly disabled members,
who would not be ABAWDs. While we would have liked to identify
ABAWD households more precisely, the administrative data for the different states lacked reliable indicators for disability status. In the end,
we chose a category of households that had a high probability of containing ABAWD members but that could also be constructed comparably across states.
The other two groups of households are used as pseudo-controls
in our analyses. Households with children usually do not contain
ABAWDs, although some of these households, such as those with both
adult and minor children and with multiple generations co-residing,
might include ABAWDs. Parents and other adults in households with
children might also be affected by exemptions and waivers if they are
mandatory participants in their state’s E&T program. Households with
only “elderly” members (defined in this chapter as people who are at
least 50 years old) do not contain ABAWDs; however, these households
may be less comparable because of their sources of income and work
limitations.
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For all three types of households, we estimate separate hazard probabilities for households that lived in counties that had exemptions or
waivers from the ABAWD work requirements and counties that did not
have exemptions or waivers—that is, counties in which the rules were
in force.
These comparisons are inexact. As mentioned, the comparisons do
not precisely identify ABAWD and non-ABAWD households. Also, the
characteristics that we use to distinguish households in these descriptive
analyses are all measured as of the start of the households’ food stamp
spells. A household’s composition could change over the course of a
spell. Also, the household’s county of residence or its county’s exemption or waiver status could change during the spell. These issues with
time-varying household and county characteristics are addressed in our
multivariate analyses and do not appear to affect the results much.
Figure 4.1 displays graphs of the monthly food stamp exit hazard
probabilities for the first 24 months of households’ program spells in
Georgia. The top panel shows the hazards for nonelderly childless
households who began their food stamp spells in either an exempt or
nonexempt county.5 The middle panel shows the hazards for households
with children, and the bottom panel shows the hazards for households
with only elderly members.
Nonelderly childless households living in Georgia counties with
ABAWD work rules and time limits were much more likely to leave
the Food Stamp Program during the first 6 months of their spells than
similar households living in counties that were exempt from these rules.
The differences in the probabilities over these months are substantial,
ranging from 2.1 to 5.6 percentage points, and 21 to 67 percent in relative terms. After the sixth month, the differences in the hazard probabilities for the households in exempt and nonexempt counties are generally smaller, and are sometimes negative and sometimes positive after
month 13. The differences seem consistent with the effects of the time
limits—higher hazard rates appeared in counties that were subject to
these policies, appeared in the first few months of spells when time
limits would have had their effects, and were less apparent during later
periods in the spells when time limits would have been less relevant.
The differences in the hazard rates for nonelderly adults lead to
noticeable differences in their median spell lengths. The median food
stamp spell for nonelderly adult-only households living in nonexempt
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Figure 4.1 Estimated Food Stamp Program Exit Hazard Probabilities
for Georgia Households Living in Counties with and without
ABAWD Exemptions and Waivers
Non-elderlyhouseholds
households without
without children
Nonelderly

0.35

Not exempt

0.30

Exempt

0.25
0.20
0.15
0.10
0.05
0.00

1

4

7

10

13
Months

16

19

22

19

22

19

22

Households with children

0.35

Not exempt

0.30

Exempt

0.25
0.20
0.15
0.10
0.05
0.00

1

4

7

10

13
Months

16

Elderly households without children

0.35

Not exempt

0.30

Exempt

0.25
0.20
0.15
0.10
0.05
0.00

1

4

7

10

13
Months

16

SOURCE: Authors’ calculations of Kaplan-Meier hazard probabilities from Georgia
administrative data for FY 2001–2007.
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counties in Georgia was 6.6 months, while the median spell for nonelderly adult-only households living in exempt counties was 9.2 months.
We see smaller differences in exit behavior for other Georgia households living in exempt and nonexempt counties, and the pattern of differences over the food stamp spell is not the same. From the middle
panel of Figure 4.1, households with children living in nonexempt
counties were no more likely to leave Georgia’s Food Stamp Program
during the first four months of their spells than households living in
exempt counties. However, for some months after the fourth, households living in nonexempt counties had elevated risks of leaving. The
small differences in exit behavior contribute to modest differences in
median spell lengths—11.0 and 12.1 months for those living in nonexempt and exempt counties, respectively. These differences may be
attributable to the nonexempt counties having better economic circumstances than exempt counties. For elderly households, we see a similar
pattern with no differences in the second and third months of a spell but
some differences at later durations. The contrast in findings between
nonelderly childless households and these two other groups of households, especially during the early months of spell durations, strengthens
the interpretation of the results for the former group as indicating effects
of ABAWD work rules and time limits.
We repeat this analysis for Missouri, using the data from FY 2004–
2007. Figure 4.2 shows monthly hazard probabilities estimated for
nonelderly households without children (top panel), households with
children (middle panel), and households with only elderly members
(bottom panel). For each of these groups, we estimate hazard probabilities separately for households living in counties with exemptions to the
ABAWD work rules (dashed lines) and counties without exemptions
(solid lines).
From these data, we see patterns that are qualitatively similar to
those from Georgia, although differences are somewhat smaller. Nonelderly childless households living in nonexempt areas and thus potentially subject to the ABAWD work rules and time limits had hazard
probabilities during the first 7 months of their spells that were higher
than those for households living in exempt counties. After those first 7
months, the hazard patterns for the remainder of the spells are indistinguishable. The median spell length for nonelderly adult-only households in nonexempt counties was 6.7 months, while the median spell
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Figure 4.2 Estimated Food Stamp Program Exit Hazard Probabilities
for Missouri Households Living in Counties with and without
ABAWD Exemptions and Waivers
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SOURCE: Authors’ calculations of Kaplan-Meier hazard probabilities from Missouri
administrative data for FY 2004–2007.
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length for nonelderly adult-only households in exempt counties was
7.2 months. There were few noticeable differences in the hazard probabilities over most parts of the spells for households with children and
households with only elderly members. These groups also exhibited
few differences in median spell lengths between nonexempt and exempt
counties. Despite the fact that differences between hazard probabilities
for those in exempt and nonexempt counties are small, the results provide a clear confirmation of our hypothesis. ABAWD time limit policies induce differences in the exit probabilities early in a spell, but such
effects are not present in households without ABAWDs.
Figure 4.3 shows the descriptive hazard estimates for South Carolina. Recall that South Carolina obtained a statewide exemption for all
its counties after FY 2002. Because of this, we limit our descriptive
analysis to spells and benefit months from FY 2001–2002 to increase
the comparability between the exempt and nonexempt counties. From
the top panel, we see that nonelderly childless households for this
period had substantially higher hazard probabilities during the first five
months of their food stamp spells if they lived in counties that were
subject to the ABAWD work rules and time limits than if they lived
in other counties. The differences in the hazard rates were especially
pronounced in the third and fourth months of the spells, near the point
where the time limit would have come into play. Starting in the sixth
month, there were fewer discernable differences, with higher exit rates
in some months for households living in nonexempt counties but higher
in other months for households living in exempt counties. The differences in the estimated hazard rates lead to substantial differences in the
median spell lengths. The median spell for nonelderly adult-only households living in nonexempt counties was 7.6 months, while the median
spell for nonelderly adult-only households living in exempt counties
was 11.2 months. The results in the top panel, which use administrative
data from FY 2001–2002, are consistent with the results from Ribar,
Edelhoch, and Liu (2010), which use data from FY 1996–2005. More
generally, the results fit with what we would expect from the ABAWD
time limit policy.
The next two panels in Figure 4.3 show food stamp exit hazard
estimates for South Carolina households with children (middle panel)
and households with only elderly members (bottom panel). For both
groups, households living in nonexempt counties had exit hazard prob-
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Figure 4.3 Estimated Food Stamp Program Exit Hazard Probabilities
for South Carolina Households Living in Counties with and
without ABAWD Exemptions and Waivers
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SOURCE: Authors’ calculations of Kaplan-Meier hazard probabilities from South Carolina administrative data for FY 2001–2002.
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abilities that were slightly higher and median spell lengths that were
slightly shorter than the hazards for households living in exempt counties in most months. These led to modest differences in median spell
lengths, which may indicate that better economic circumstances in nonexempt counties played a role in food stamp exits. In the next section,
we reexamine the hazard relationships using multivariate models that
explicitly control for county economic conditions and other observable
characteristics of households.

MULTIVARIATE RESULTS
For each state and for each of the three types of households, we estimate discrete-time logistic hazard models (Alison 1982) of food stamp
exits that include separate flexible (monthly dummy variable) controls
for the duration patterns for households that were living in counties with
exemptions or waivers or in counties without exemptions or waivers.
Our multivariate models also include controls for the household’s food
stamp benefit level, earned income, unearned income, zero-income status, number of members, and number of children (for households with
children); the household head’s age, education, race, and marital status;
the age of the youngest member (households with children); and the
presence of any members over age 60 (where appropriate). In addition to measures that capture detailed recipient characteristics, we also
control for fiscal year fixed effects and the level of unemployment in
the county. Because exempt counties generally have slower-growing
economies than nonexempt counties, observed differences might reflect
different labor markets, so controls for unemployment are expected to
remove or at least reduce observed differences.
To show the adjusted duration patterns from these models, we take
the estimated model coefficients for a state and type of household and
apply them to every household observation of the same type in that
state to form predictions of the hazard rates. The predictions assume
that the households entered the Food Stamp Program on particular
dates—October 2000 for Georgia and South Carolina and October 2003
for Missouri—and that the households maintained the same observed
characteristics as their first month on the program. Predicted hazard
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rates from this procedure for Georgia, Missouri, and South Carolina are
shown in Figures 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6, respectively.
The predicted hazard probabilities from the multivariate models
show the same general patterns as the descriptive estimates. Even after
adjusting for economic conditions and household characteristics, nonelderly childless households were more likely to leave the Food Stamp
Program during the early months of their participation spells if they
lived in counties that were subject to the ABAWD work rules and time
limits than if they lived in counties with exemptions or waivers to these
rules. These differences appear for all three states that we examine. Also
consistent with the descriptive results, there were fewer differences and
less consistent patterns in the later months of the spells.
In contrast, the patterns of predicted hazard results for households
with children and for elderly households vary across states. In Georgia, the predicted hazards for these groups were higher in some months
if they were living in nonexempt counties than if they were living in
exempt counties but only during the later months of predicted food
stamp spells. For households with children and elderly households in
Missouri, there were few differences between the predicted hazards for
those living in nonexempt and exempt counties. In South Carolina, predicted hazards for the comparison groups in the early months of their
food stamp spells were slightly higher in nonexempt counties than in
exempt counties. However, there were fewer consistent differences in
the later months of their spells.

CONCLUSION
Since the early 1970s, the Food Stamp Program has used work
requirements of various forms to overcome the program’s employment
disincentives. With the enactment of the PRWORA in 1996, the program adopted an especially stringent requirement that ABAWDs could
receive benefits only for three months in a given three-year period
unless they worked or participated in equivalent activities for at least 20
hours a week. The work rules and time limits were expected to reduce
program participation.
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Figure 4.4 Regression- and Population-Adjusted Food Stamp Program
Exit Hazard Probabilities for Georgia Households Living in
Areas with and without ABAWD Exemptions and Waivers
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SOURCE: Authors’ calculations of hazard probabilities obtained by applying coefficients from multivariate, discrete-time hazard models of food stamp exits estimated
using Georgia administrative data to first-month observations from all observed spells
in those data and assuming the specified start months.
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Figure 4.5 Regression- and Population-Adjusted Food Stamp Program
Exit Hazard Probabilities for Missouri Households Living in
Areas with and without ABAWD Exemptions and Waivers
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SOURCE: Authors’ calculations of hazard probabilities obtained by applying coefficients from multivariate, discrete-time hazard models of food stamp exits estimated
using Missouri administrative data to first-month observations from all observed
spells in those data and assuming the specified start months.
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Figure 4.6 Regression- and Population-Adjusted Food Stamp Program
Exit Hazard Probabilities for South Carolina Households
Living in Areas with and without ABAWD Exemptions
and Waivers
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SOURCE: Authors’ calculations of hazard probabilities obtained by applying coefficients from multivariate, discrete-time hazard models of food stamp exits estimated
using South Carolina administrative data to first-month observations from all observed
spells in those data and assuming the specified start months.
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The PRWORA allowed states to apply for waivers from these
requirements in areas with poor job prospects, and subsequent legislation allowed states to apply for exemptions for up to 15 percent of their
ABAWD caseloads. The three states that we study obtained exemptions
and waivers for specific periods for specific geographic areas. This created a situation in which some identifiable households were potentially
subject to the ABAWD work rules and time limits while another set of
identifiable households was not. We use this geographic and longitudinal variation in the applicability of the ABAWD rules to examine their
effects on households’ food stamp exit behavior.
In descriptive and multivariate event-history analyses, we uniformly
find that childless households with adults aged 18–49 living in counties
that were subject to the ABAWD work rules and time limits were more
likely to leave the Food Stamp Program during the early months of their
program spells than similar households living in counties with exemptions or waivers to these rules. The differences in the hazard probabilities were substantial. Nonelderly childless households were estimated
to be several percentage points more likely to leave the program in each
of their second through sixth spell months if they lived in a nonexempt
county. These differences in program exit behavior among nonelderly
childless households were largely confined to the first few months of a
spell. Nevertheless, they led to nonelderly childless households having
much shorter median spell lengths if they were living in a nonexempt
county and potentially subject to the ABAWD rules. It is notable that
controls for individual characteristics or the local economy had no systemic effect on estimates.
We also find some evidence of differences in exit behavior by county
exemption status among two pseudo-control groups: households with
children and households with only elderly members. However, the differences—when they appeared—tended to be muted compared to those
for nonelderly childless households. Also, the differences were much
less uniform for households in exempt counties, which sometimes had
higher exit probabilities than households in nonexempt counties.
The patterns of findings, with relatively large differences in exit
behavior appearing for nonelderly childless households and mainly in
the early months of program spells, fit with what we would expect from
an ABAWD time limit policy. The empirical findings strongly suggest that work rules and time limits for ABAWDs shortened their Food
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Stamp Program spells and reduced their participation. These results
appeared in all three states and in multivariate analyses. Thus, the findings are robust in a number of ways.
There are some important qualifications to this analysis. First, while
we can identify households that are more likely than others to include
ABAWDs, we cannot pinpoint these households exactly. In particular,
our group of nonelderly childless households meets two of the three
principal criteria for the ABAWD classification—the age and household structure criteria. However, we do not know the disability status of household members, which means that some might not contain
ABAWDs. We expect, though, that a more precise identification would
lead to even larger differences. Second, we do not have direct information about whether or when a household has reached its time limit. A
household on its second spell within a three-year period might already
have some months that were counted toward its limit. Also, some
states, including Missouri, allowed for slightly longer time limits than
the three months specified in the PRWORA. Third, our pseudo-control
groups of households with children and with elderly members might
not be directly comparable to nonelderly childless households, and the
households with children might include ABAWD members or members
subject to other E&T requirements. Finally, we use a county’s exemption or waiver status as an indicator for the applicability of ABAWD
work rules and time limits, and these counties might not be comparable,
as waivers were granted on the basis of economic conditions.
These qualifications notwithstanding, the evidence strongly points
to work rules and time limits hastening exits from the Food Stamp
Program, shortening program spells, and reducing program participation. The implications for households’ well-being are more ambiguous.
ABAWDs who left the Food Stamp Program because they transitioned
to work and lost eligibility for financial reasons might have been made
better off. However, ABAWDs who failed to find jobs and were timelimited off the Food Stamp Program were almost certainly worse off, at
least in the short run. The time limits may have contributed to increased
work and earnings for some ABAWDs but, for those who remained
unemployed for extended periods, immiseration would surely have
increased.
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Notes
1. Hoynes and Schanzenbach (2012) provide empirical evidence that the introduction of food stamps in the 1960s and 1970s did, in fact, cause female household
heads to decrease work effort. Using data for the 1980s, Hagstrom (1996) examines married couples’ response to food stamps, finding small effects, mostly for
females. A recent discussion of work disincentive effects of SNAP is provided by
Moffitt (2016), who explicitly considers the way that participation in multiple programs influences work incentives. Although he suggests that work disincentives
are minimal for the poorest SNAP participants, disincentives are often substantial
for those whose earnings are just below self-sufficiency. In contrast, focusing on
the combined impacts of U.S. safety net programs during the economic downturn
after 2007, Mulligan (2012) argues that the increased generosity of these programs induced a substantial decline in work incentives for a wide range of workers, results at odds with those of Moffitt. An extended exchange can be found in
Moffitt (2015) and Mulligan (2015).
2. An area can be designated as a labor surplus area if the average unemployment
rate over the prior 24 months was 20 percent above the average in the United
States, or under “exceptional circumstances.” Although criteria vary over time,
this latter designation is generally used when a recent increase in unemployment,
possibly not reflected in current statistics, is expected to last into the subsequent
year. See https://www.doleta.gov/programs/lsa_faq.cfm (accessed Oct. 23, 2018).
3. Prior to FY 2001, Missouri’s unemployment rate was substantially below the
national rate. In FY 2002 and 2003 Missouri’s unemployment rate was near or
below the national rate. The state’s unemployment rate peaked in 2004, well after
the peak in the national rate. Low unemployment rates relative to the national rate
made it harder for Missouri to obtain “labor surplus” designations for its counties.
4. Besides differing from other chapters, our definition of “elderly” in this chapter
differs from the Food Stamp Program definition used for other purposes, which is
based on the age-60 cutoff.
5. Here and throughout the rest of the chapter, we use the single word exempt to
mean either exempt or waived from the ABAWD work rules and time limits.

5
Improving the Program
for Working Families
SQUEEZING A POLICY BALLOON
The principal objective of the Food Stamp Program is to help
low-income families obtain better and more nutritious diets than they
otherwise could afford. Within this objective are several other goals,
including operating the program as efficiently as possible by targeting
benefits to the truly needy and promoting economic self-sufficiency
among families. Different aspects of the Food Stamp Program work to
further these goals. The benefits associated with the program expand
families’ resource sets, which allows them to purchase more and better
food. Means-testing, recertification, reporting requirements, and verification are intended to target assistance, which promotes efficiency.
Work requirements for able-bodied adults and lower benefit reduction
rates for earnings are intended to encourage work and thereby foster
economic self-sufficiency.
While each of these policies advances one or more of the program’s
goals, they also have the unfortunate effect of undermining others.
Higher benefits may improve access to nutrition, but they also generate
income effects that may discourage work and economic self-sufficiency.
Means-testing limits eligibility to low-income families and concentrates
assistance among the neediest families, but it also disincentivizes work
and accurate income reporting. More frequent recertifications, more
intrusive income reporting, and tougher verification requirements can
improve the information about clients’ circumstances, but they undermine the program’s principal objective by reducing participation. Time
limits and other work requirements encourage some food stamp participants to find jobs, but they can sever benefits for others who are either
unable or unwilling to work.
At times it seems that these different policy considerations are like
squeezing a balloon. You tighten your grip around one part of the bal-
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loon and another part of the balloon expands. Grab ahold of that part of
the balloon, and yet another part expands. Policies enacted in the early
and mid-1990s, most notably the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) in 1996, tended to impose
more stringent requirements on participants. However, policymakers
quickly grew concerned that vulnerable groups might suffer. From 1996
until 2013, most of the changes in the Food Stamp Program took the
form of relaxing requirements, especially for working households.
In this chapter, we review a wide set of policy changes that have
likely boosted participation among working families and also encouraged work among food stamp families. We begin by reviewing the evidence and drawing policy implications from our previous three chapters regarding how work and earnings are reported in the Food Stamp
Program, how certification intervals are associated with participation
behavior, and how ABAWD time limits are also associated with participation. Beyond longer certification intervals and reduced applicability of the ABAWD time limits, we review other ways that food stamp
policies were relaxed (or at least changed) between 2001 and 2007.
Finally, we examine the program since the onset of the 2007 recession
and subsequent recovery, considering both changes in the program and
the debates surrounding it. We hazard a prediction on the fate of the
program over the next decade. Finally, we discuss some ways in which
we might further modify the program to benefit working families.

OUR FINDINGS
Chapter 2 introduced the administrative data that we used in our
empirical analyses of Georgia, Missouri, and South Carolina. These
data provide precise information about households’ Food Stamp Program outcomes and reveal the information that was available to program administrators. At the same time, the data have limitations, of
which the biggest may be that they record only the earnings that were
reported to state food stamp agencies and not necessarily the earnings
that clients actually received. Comparisons of earnings reported by the
clients in the food stamp records and of earnings separately reported by
their employers to the states’ Unemployment Insurance (UI) systems
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indicate substantial disagreement. In particular, the average incidence
and amounts of earnings reported on behalf of food stamp households
in the UI systems were each higher than the averages reported to the
food stamp agencies. Food stamp agency data indicate that about a third
of households in the states that we studied worked, but our augmented
data indicate that the true figure may be one half or more. Depending
on the state and year, the average monthly value of earnings reported by
households to food stamp agencies was $30–$114 less than the average
amounts recorded in the UI systems. Some of the apparent underreporting of earnings may be illicit. However, some is sanctioned by state
policies where benefits are based on clients’ expected future income
and other policies that do not require clients to report certain types of
income changes within certification periods. We discuss income reporting policies more in the next section of this chapter.
In Chapter 3, we used the administrative data from each state to
examine how the timing of exits from food stamp participation spells
and the durations of those spells varied with the timing of clients’ periodic recertifications for eligibility and benefits. The analyses for all
three states revealed that food stamp households were several times
more likely to end their participation spells in months when recertifications were due than in months they were not. During our analysis period,
each of our states increased its recertification intervals for households
with earnings from 3 months to 6 months, and our data allowed us to
investigate participation spells under both the 3- and 6-month regimes
in two of the states. We estimated that longer recertification intervals
led to longer median spell lengths, which would have increased participation. Late in our analysis period, one of our analysis states, South
Carolina, shortened its recertification interval for households with fixed
sources of unearned income from 12 to 6 months. We found that the
median spell lengths for the affected households decreased. This change
from South Carolina notwithstanding, the general trend among states
following the 2002 Farm Bill was to increase the lengths of recertification intervals. The empirical analyses from Chapter 3 indicate that
these changes help to explain why food stamp participation rose and
why caseloads continued to increase even after the economy began to
recover in the mid-2000s.
In Chapter 4, we used the administrative data to investigate how
food stamp participation spells varied across counties in our three states
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that were and were not subject to work requirements and 3-month time
limits for ABAWDs. Time limits on food stamp participation were
imposed as part of the PRWORA. However, that legislation allowed
states to exempt ABAWDs living in areas with weak job markets, and
subsequent legislation and policy changes allowed states to waive the
requirements for other ABAWDs. All three of our analysis states sought
exemptions and waivers, and these serve as the basis for our empirical
comparisons. Our empirical analyses show that adult-only households
with members who were 18–49 years old were more likely to leave the
Food Stamp Program in the first few months of their participation spells
if they lived in counties with ABAWD work rules and time limits than if
they lived in counties that were exempt from these rules. The difference
in food stamp exit behavior was less evident in later months of food
stamp spells; they were also less evident for households with children
and for elderly households who were less likely to include ABAWDs.
During the period that we examine, the use of exemptions and waivers
increased among states, which had the effect of weakening the ABAWD
work rules. Our analyses indicate that these changes also contributed to
the overall increase in Food Stamp Program participation.
There were other ways in which food stamp policies were relaxed
during the 2000s. We now turn to discuss these and other possible policy changes.

INCOME REPORTING AND ELIGIBILITY WITHIN
CERTIFICATION PERIODS
As we mentioned, food stamp households generally receive less
scrutiny and provide less supporting information during their certification periods than at the ends of those periods. On top of that, USDA
policies and the 2002 Farm Bill allowed states to decrease the types
and frequency of income changes that had to be reported. In the late
1990s, the USDA had two stated income reporting policies that states
could adopt: a monthly periodic-reporting policy in which households
reported their circumstances each month regardless of whether any
income changes occurred, and a change-reporting policy in which
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households were required to report any changes of more than $25 in
monthly income within 10 days of the change occurring. States could
apply different policies to different types of clients. In addition, USDA
approved waivers for states with periodic-reporting policies that wanted
to use quarterly reporting for households with earnings.
In late 2000, the USDA gave states the option of adopting semiannual reporting for working households with 6-month or longer certification periods, in which the households were required to report only
changes in income that brought them above the gross eligibility limit of
130 percent of the federal poverty threshold (Food and Nutrition Service 2000). For states with change-reporting policies, including some
states with quarterly and semiannual reporting, the USDA approved
waivers for states to require limited types of change reporting including
• status reporting: changes in having or not having a job, changes
in part-time or full-time status, or changes in wage rates,
• five-hour reporting: changes in weekly work amounting to more
than five hours, or
• $100 reporting: changes in earnings of more than $100.
By early 2002, 9 states required monthly reporting, 6 (including
South Carolina) required quarterly reporting, 19 (including Georgia and
Missouri) required semiannual reporting, and the rest relied on some
type of change reporting for earners (Food and Nutrition Service 2002).
By 2007, only three states required monthly reporting, and only one
required quarterly reporting (Food and Nutrition Service 2007). All of
the other states had adopted some type of simplified reporting procedure for working households.
Of the three states that we consider, Missouri required reports in
2007 whenever monthly earnings changed by more than $100, and
Georgia and South Carolina required reports when monthly income
increased beyond the gross eligibility threshold. Recipients in these and
other states were, of course, free to report any decreases in earnings that
would allow them to receive more benefits.
The Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (the 2008 Farm
Bill) gave states more flexibility in using simplified reporting, allowing
them to place all clients on simplified reporting, including disabled,
elderly, and homeless clients who had not previously been eligible for
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this policy. The use of simplified reporting remains at the state’s discretion, and many states continue to adopt this optional feature only for a
subset of their clients.
Consider the effects of mandating a general simplified income
reporting policy for most households.1 Under such a policy, increases
in earnings (or other income) that occur during a certification period
would have to be reported only if they passed the 130 percent threshold. This effectively eliminates the benefit reduction rate and hence the
implicit tax on earned income up to the threshold, increasing the reward
associated with work. Not only does simplified income reporting incentivize employment and work effort, it also reduces compliance costs for
households, which increases participation. It also reduces compliance
costs for state administrators. Thus, the policy can increase economic
self-sufficiency and boost families’ access to food, while reducing
administrative burdens for states.
The principal drawback of simplified income reporting is that it
increases program costs by reducing the accuracy of targeting—normal
means-testing is applied at the start of a certification period, but limited
means-testing only occurs for the subsequent duration of the period.
Another drawback to the policy is that it can create a notch or cliff in
the household’s budget set that harshly penalizes earnings above the
130 percent threshold. It seems likely that relaxed income reporting
requirements contributed to longer spells, larger caseloads, and a higher
incidence of work among food stamp families. A uniform policy of simplified income reporting would help working families.
There is a logical extension to this policy that may encourage work
further—eliminate income reporting altogether within set periods or for
the entire certification period. Under such a policy, incomes and other
eligibility information would be reported at initial application and at
each recertification but not in between. During the years that we study,
California had a policy of quarterly-periodic reporting in which food
stamp households reported their incomes every three months, instead of
every month or when incomes changed. Within the quarter, incomes for
California food stamp recipients could rise above the gross eligibility
threshold, but the households would maintain their benefits. California’s periodic-reporting policy eliminates the notch in the budget constraint within periods, though it does increase the frequency of income
reporting compared to simplified semiannual income reporting.
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Another existing food stamp policy—transitional food stamp benefits—effectively eliminates income reporting. The 2002 Farm Bill
authorized states to offer transitional benefits to households that left
the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program. These
benefits are set at the level that the family was receiving while on
TANF, possibly with an increase to reflect the loss of TANF income,
and are authorized for up to five months, during which income reporting requirements are dropped. In October 2003, 10 states were offering
transitional benefits (Food and Nutrition Service 2003), and by November 2007, so were Georgia and 6 additional states (Food and Nutrition
Service 2007). The 2008 Farm Bill added more flexibility by allowing states to offer transitional benefits to families who left state-funded
assistance programs, rather than just those who left federally supported
TANF programs.
There is also precedent for the elimination of income reporting
in other food assistance programs. Children’s eligibility for free and
reduced-price meals in the National School Lunch and School Breakfast Programs is determined for the duration of a school year and for up
to one month in the subsequent school year, even if their households’
economic circumstances improve in the interim. Similarly, assistance
under the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants
and Children is certified for periods ranging from six weeks to a year,
depending on the beneficiaries, with no income reporting requirement
within the certification period.
Critics might object that the elimination of income reporting within
certification periods would undermine the Food Stamp Program’s targeting objective, allowing some families with relatively high incomes
to receive benefits for short periods of time. However, an argument can
be made that the elimination of income reporting actually makes the
program fairer. The issue is that food stamp application and eligibility
procedures mostly target prospective disadvantage but not retrospective disadvantage. Consider a working household with no other sources
of income that suddenly loses its source of employment and earnings.
Unless the household applies immediately for food stamp benefits, it
will go some time without assistance. It is not possible under the current program to recover benefits retrospectively from an earlier period
of eligibility that preceded an application. Simplified income reporting
policies and long-interval periodic reporting policies can increase fair-
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ness by making up on the back end what the program fails to provide
on the front end.

REDUCE OTHER PARTICIPATION BARRIERS
The federal rules for the Food Stamp Program count the fair market
values beyond $4,650 of vehicles for each household adult and commuting teenager as financial resources, which are included in the asset
test for determining program eligibility. The federal rules exempt vehicles under some circumstances, such as when they are used to produce
income, used to travel long distances to work, and used as people’s
homes. At the same time, they are less generous with extra vehicles,
counting the entire fair market value for them. The vehicle rules may
be detrimental to working families with members who commute, especially rural workers who not only confront long travel distances but also
have few, if any, public transportation options.
Over the time period that we considered, states were granted considerable flexibility to relax these vehicle policies. First, states were
allowed to expand the types of households that were categorically eligible for food stamps. Recall that categorically eligible households only
have to meet the income and asset requirements of the “other” assistance program. The vehicle and resource requirements of these programs are often less stringent than those of the Food Stamp Program.
Under the original program rules, households were categorically eligible if all their members received benefits from TANF, SSI, or General
Assistance. Under the expanded option, households could be categorically eligible if any of the members received a TANF-funded or related
state-funded benefit or service that helped the rest of the household,
so long as the household’s gross income was below twice the poverty
level. By 2007, 35 states, including Georgia, Missouri, and South Carolina, had adopted some form of such broad-based categorical eligibility.
To see how broad-based categorical eligibility works, consider
Georgia’s policy. Households there that apply for food stamps are first
screened for eligibility in the state’s TANF Community Outreach Services (TCOS) program, which provides information and referral services to households with incomes below 130 percent of the poverty
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line (or 200 percent on the poverty line if the household has elderly or
disabled members). If the household meets these standards, the caseworker discusses the available services with the applicant, hands the
applicant a brochure, and has the applicant sign a “Rights and Responsibilities” statement, thereby conferring services. Households thus
enrolled in the TCOS program are then categorically eligible for food
stamps. The TCOS program has no asset requirements, and its gross
income standards are exactly the same as those of the Food Stamp Program. Through this bit of administrative wizardry, Georgia food stamp
clients are absolved of the federal resource requirements involving not
only vehicles but also all financial assets.
The second option for states comes from provisions in the Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related
Appropriations Act of 2001 (P.L. 106-387) and the subsequent 2002
Farm Bill. These provisions allowed states to realign their food stamp
vehicle policies with the policies in place for their other assistance programs if those other policies were more favorable to clients.
By 2007, all states had modified their rules for some or all of their
food stamp recipients, including 33 that had adopted rules from their
TANF programs, 10 that adopted rules from their child care or foster
care assistance programs, and 8 that expanded their definition of categorical eligibility to include households receiving services and in-kind
benefits from their TANF programs. This resulted in 29 states effectively excluding all vehicles from the asset tests, 16 excluding at least
one vehicle per household from the tests, and the remainder exceeding
the federal exclusion value of $4,650 for one or more vehicles.
Of the states that we examine, Missouri began excluding an extra
portion of households’ vehicle values in August 2000, following the
approval of a waiver from the USDA. Since July 2001 Missouri has
excluded the value of all vehicles. South Carolina also liberalized its
vehicle policies early in our study period, with changes that went into
effect in April 2001. The state currently excludes the value of all vehicles from eligibility calculations. In contrast, Georgia was one of the
last states in the country to relax its vehicle policies, changing its policies in 2006.
Although vehicle rules represent a potential barrier to food stamp
participation, quantitative analyses suggest that their effects are modest. Cunnyngham and Ohls (2008) simulate food stamp eligibility for
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households under different sets of asset policies. They find that most
households that appeared to be eligible under the asset rules in place in
their state of residence in January 2007 would have remained eligible if
their state had adopted another state’s rules. Only 11 percent of households were “marginally eligible” in the sense that their eligibility would
have changed in more than a handful of other states. Of these marginally eligible households, nearly half had incomes above the 130 percent gross income threshold (many of these higher-income households
had elderly or disabled members), and 41 percent would have qualified
only for the minimum food stamp benefit. Cunnyngham and Ohls also
simulate how eligibility would change if states reverted to the narrower
federal asset policies. Their analysis indicates that only 8 percent of
initially eligible households were at risk of losing their eligibility from
this type of policy change. They do not examine actual participation.
However, the modest size of the eligibility changes coupled with the
tiny benefits for many of the eligible households suggest that the participation effects are small.
Hanratty (2006) directly examines the relationship between participation and vehicle policies using household-level survey data and finds
no significant association. In contrast, Ratcliffe, McKernan, and Finegold (2008) find evidence that relaxing vehicle policies did increase
food stamp participation.
Even if a general policy of excluding vehicles from the calculation
of assets only modestly boosts participation, the policy still could well
be worthwhile. The evidence from Cunnyngham and Ohls indicates that
the most stringent federal vehicle rules would affect outcomes only for
a small proportion of households. Nevertheless, screening for vehicles
requires collecting, tracking, and maintaining information for all households. If vehicles were excluded, the administrative costs and burdens
for clients and state agencies could be reduced. In all, the change would
simplify the Food Stamp Program, making it easier to administer and
understand.
The food stamp vehicle rules are part of a broader policy involving asset eligibility. For much of the recent history of the Food Stamp
Program, the asset test has limited eligibility to fixed amounts. In 2001,
these amounts were $3,000 for elderly households and $2,000 for all
other households. The 2002 Farm Bill increased the limit for disabled
households to the same $3,000 as elderly households but still left the
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amounts fixed in nominal terms. Asset limits are an obvious barrier to
participation; they also discourage savings among food stamp households. Even among poor families that are not currently receiving benefits, a substantial portion may choose to minimize savings in order
to assure eligibility for means-tested programs if needed in the future
(Wellschmied 2015). Because of creeping inflation, the barrier has
become more stringent over time. Broad-based categorical eligibility
allows states to waive not only the vehicle requirements but also the
asset requirements altogether. Thus, the wider adoption of expanded
categorical eligibility has eliminated the asset barrier for households in
many states.2
The 2008 Farm Bill loosened the restriction even more. For the first
time since asset limits were established, the legislation indexes them
for inflation.3 The 2008 Farm Bill also excluded certain types of taxadvantaged savings accounts, such as individual retirement accounts
and educational savings accounts, from the calculation of assets.

IMPROVING BENEFITS
The USDA sets the maximum food stamp benefit amounts for
households each year based on the cost of its Thrifty Food Plan (TFP),
which is a basket of foods that can be obtained at low cost but still
provide a nutritious diet. In principle, this approach to setting benefits
should lead to adequate food assistance; however, there are questions
regarding whether this is the case (Caswell and Yaktine 2013; HartlineGrafton and Weill 2012). For one thing, food stamp benefits are set
annually using a TFP value that is lagged by several months. Inflation—
from the time that benefits are set and over the course of the year while
benefits are nominally fixed—erodes their real value, causing them to
fall below contemporaneous TFP values.4 The TFP also relies on strong
assumptions about households’ capabilities and time availability. For
example, the TFP is based on many meals that require substantial
amounts of preparation and cooking time. The underlying time assumptions may be unrealistic for working households, and food stamp benefits could be inadequate if these households have to consume more
expensive, prepared foods. Third, the TFP, which is the least expensive
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USDA food plan, leaves little margin for errors, possible food waste, or
other problems.
The net food stamp benefit formula, which reduces the maximum
allotment by 20 percent less for changes in earned income than changes
in unearned income, already recognizes that working households may
have more costs than other households, such as commuting and clothing costs. An even higher allotment for working households could be
justified by these households’ higher food costs. More adequate benefits
for working households would increase their access to nutritious foods
and encourage participation.
Several changes to the net benefit formula have led to more generous benefits. The 2002 Farm Bill changed the formula’s standard
deduction so that it varied with family size and would subsequently rise
with inflation. The legislation also let states use a simplified Standard
Utility Allowance rather than have households present actual utility
bills to claim an allowance. This change made it easier for households
to deduct the allowance. The 2008 Farm Bill increased the standard
deduction for households with one to three members, removed the cap
on child care expenses, and increased the minimum benefit for households with one or two members.
The maximum benefit itself was temporarily increased by 13.6 percent as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009
(ARRA). This substantial increase in benefits was targeted primarily
at stimulating the economy as the United States was plunging into the
depths of the Great Recession. The benefit increase remained in effect
until October 2013, when it reverted to the previous amount of 100
percent of the TFP. During the early years of the recession, however,
the benefit increase was estimated to have contributed to a 3 percent
increase in the food stamp participation rate as well as an improvement
in households’ food security (Nord and Prell 2011).

REDUCING SANCTIONS FOR ABAWDS AND OTHERS
The three-month time limit on food stamp benefit receipt for nonworking ABAWDs is an unusually harsh and arguably inhumane policy.
Nonelderly adults who are neither parents nor disabled are categorically
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ineligible for cash assistance from the TANF, Supplemental Security
Income, or Social Security Disability Income programs. At one time,
many ABAWDs would have been eligible for state-funded General
Assistance (GA) programs. However, the number of states operating
such programs has greatly diminished. Schott and Cho (2011) survey
states and find that the number offering GA to employable adults fell
from 25 in 1989 to only 12 in 2011 and that the number offering GA
to unemployable adults shrank from 38 to 30.5 Schott and Cho further
report that many of the states that have maintained programs have cut
benefits, tightened eligibility, imposed time limits, or enacted a combination of these changes.
The stark reality is that the Food Stamp Program is the last strand
in the social safety net for most ABAWDs. Wolkwitz and Leftin (2008)
estimate that in FY 2007 nearly half (46 percent) of food stamp households with ABAWD members and nearly two-thirds (62 percent) of
ABAWDs living alone had no other countable income whatsoever.
With no earnings and with no other public assistance to turn to, the loss
of food stamp benefits at the expiration of a time limit can mean the
difference between having some resources for food or none at all. Effectively, hunger and the withdrawal of food are the “incentives” being
used to “encourage” work—choices that would not be out of place in a
Dickens novel.
It does not have to be this way. Indeed, the ABAWD time limits
were temporarily suspended as part of the 2008 ARRA stimulus legislation. So, for a short period, the time limits disappeared. However, the
suspension ended in FY 2011.
Although the time limits have resumed, they could be made less
onerous. The present work-related time limit constitutes a full-benefit
sanction—once the time limit is imposed no benefits are issued until
either the work requirement is fulfilled or the 36-month time window
has closed. A more humane alternative that still preserves an incentive to work is to impose a partial-benefit sanction, such as a modest percentage reduction in the food stamp benefit or a restriction on
the way that benefits can be redeemed. Because the food stamp benefit
amount is already slightly below the TFP, it might be more humane
still to modestly increase benefits beyond the TFP for participants who
comply with work and other rules and to keep benefits at their present
level for others.
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OUTREACH AND INFORMATION
One reason that disadvantaged and otherwise eligible households
might not participate in the Food Stamp Program is that they lack
information about the program, their possible eligibility, or application
procedures. Daponte, Sanders, and Taylor (1999) conduct a randomassignment demonstration with Pennsylvania food pantry clients and
find that they were more likely to apply to the Food Stamp Program
if they were presented with information about the program. Stigma is
also frequently mentioned as a reason that otherwise eligible people
fail to enroll in public assistance programs (Moffitt 1983). A survey
of food stamp participants and eligible nonparticipants in 1996–1997
indicated that three quarters of eligible nonparticipants did not know
they were eligible. Although only a minority of survey respondents perceived stigma associated with participation, such perceptions had a role
in explaining nonparticipation (Ponza et al. 1999).
Outreach efforts are an important tool for increasing information,
reducing stigma, and boosting participation. The USDA has funded
millions of dollars of outreach grants to state and local organizations; it
has also subsidized the costs of outreach plans in selected states. Some
of the plans are targeted toward providing brochures and other information at places frequented by working families. During the period we
studied, Georgia and South Carolina engaged in outreach efforts with
USDA-provided funding, but Missouri did not.
While the outreach efforts may have increased participation, it is
difficult to assess their effects because the activities are not systematically documented, and there is little way to determine whether or when
households might have been exposed to outreach messages. Researchers who have attempted to examine the effects of outreach have tended
to use crude measures, such as the amount of expenditures per person
or per poor person in a state. Results using these measures have been
inconclusive. For example, Ratcliffe, McKernan, and Finegold (2008)
find that state outreach expenditures were significantly positively associated with food stamp participation in some specifications and for
some samples but insignificantly associated in other specifications and
for other samples. The potential importance of outreach is captured in
a recent qualitative study that compares state agency policies regard-
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ing the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) in Oregon
and Florida (Edwards et al. 2016). The U.S. General Accounting Office
(2004) recommends improving the documentation and tracking of specific outreach activities.

WHERE DOES FOOD ASSISTANCE GO FROM HERE?
The grip on the food stamp policy balloon has been relaxed before.
Following the nationwide rollout of the program in the 1960s and 1970s,
the program saw a further significant expansion when the program’s
original requirement that households purchase food stamps with their
own money was dropped in favor of simply distributing coupons to
participating families. However, the grip has also sometimes tightened.
The last major tightening occurred in the early and middle 1990s
and culminated in the maximum benefit reductions, ABAWD work
requirements, and other provisions of the PRWORA. Those changes
were enacted alongside other changes that moved the U.S. social safety
net away from simple income maintenance and toward work support.
Open-ended cash assistance programs such as TANF and GA were
scaled back, and work requirements and time limits were imposed.
Between 1996 and 2010, the grip on the Food Stamp Program
policy balloon relaxed, with many of the changes focused on providing positive inducements for working households rather than limits or
punishments for nonworking households. These changes included longer recertification intervals for working households, simplified income
reporting for earnings, transitional benefit alternatives, and relaxed
vehicle rules. Other changes, such as expanded exemptions and waivers
for the ABAWD work rules, smoothed some of the harshest elements of
the PRWORA, and still others, such as expanded categorical eligibility,
more generous net benefit formulas, looser asset limits, and greater outreach spending, increased the generosity and reach of the program. This
phase of policy relaxation culminated in the temporary benefit increases
and ABAWD work rule suspensions of the 2008 ARRA.
Even in the face of a very slow recovery following the 2007–2009
recession, a modest tightening in rules began after 2010. The temporary benefit increases in the ARRA were reversed effective in 2013,
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five years prior to the sunset date in the original legislation. The maximum benefit allotment reverted to its PRWORA level, and the ABAWD
time limits returned as labor markets across states began to recover. At
the state level, the momentum toward increased accessibility has been
slowed, or possibly even reversed. No additional states have adopted
broad-based categorical eligibility since 2013, and one state (Louisiana) actually discontinued implementation.6 Some states have reversed
prior moves toward liberalization of their eligibility rules. Since 2012,
Michigan and Maine have reinstated asset limits for SNAP recipients.
Pennsylvania reestablished a limit in 2012, but then eliminated it in
2015.
Debates over reauthorization of SNAP in 2013 involved major
challenges to the structure of the program. Proposals to increase work
requirements for program participation, to eliminate broad-based categorical eligibility, and to bar for life those convicted of violent crimes
had strong support from the Republican majority in the House of Representatives. At one point, a provision allowing states to administer
drug tests to SNAP applicants was approved. In July 2013, the House
passed a reauthorization of the Farm Bill that excluded SNAP, which
had accounted for up to 80 percent of the bill’s funding in prior bills. In
the end, the 2014 Farm Bill that became law after conference agreement
between the House and the Senate retained the basic structure of SNAP
and omitted the major limits on eligibility that had characterized the
House version (Gitter 2015, Chapter 4). The only substantive change
was modification of the net benefit formula to make it slightly less generous by limiting a practice used in 17 states that provided energy credits to some households regardless of actual expenses.
In the period since 2014, critics of SNAP have garnered increased
influence in the debate over the program’s reauthorization. The American use of the term welfare to refer to AFDC and then TANF has now
been expanded to include SNAP, reflecting its role as a target.7 Although
the defenders of the program remain, those who question the legitimacy of government redistribution have turned their attention to SNAP.
Prominent criticism includes the suggestion that, in conjunction with
other programs, SNAP has substantially reduced work incentives (Mulligan 2012, 2015) and that it has abetted the growth in obesity among
the poor.8 In February 2017, the Committee on Agriculture in the House
held hearings on the benefits and costs of restricting SNAP purchases,
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with the primary focus on prohibiting the purchase of sweetened soda
and similar drinks to improve the nutritional quality of recipients’ diets.
Although opponents to such restrictions dominated the hearings, their
tone clearly reflected the view that greater restrictions on recipients’
purchases might well be in order (Committee on Agriculture 2017).
In February 2018, as part of the administration’s budget, the U.S.
secretary of agriculture proposed that each SNAP household receive
half of its aid in the form of a “Harvest Box,” with food chosen to provide nutritional benefit and to aid American farmers. The response was
strongly negative, and it was never seriously considered in the reauthorization bill, but again the proposal clearly reflected popular support
for the idea that the SNAP program should apply greater constraints on
recipient purchases (Thrush 2018).
The House reauthorization bill, the Agriculture Improvement Act of
2018, included work requirements that would change SNAP’s structure
in a major way. Under the bill, most adult recipients under age 60 in
families with no children age 6 or younger would have to engage in a
work activity for at least 20 hours per week. In contrast, the bill passed
by the Senate did not include similar provisions. In the final conference
version of the bill, the most restrictive provisions were removed, leaving the structure of SNAP largely unchanged. However, the long-term
prospects remain uncertain, and even if there are no important modifications of SNAP in the near future, the pressure to pare down the program and restrict the options available to recipients remains.
Despite these challenges to SNAP, the ultimate collapse of SNAP
as a central pillar of the safety net is not inevitable. Many of the proposals suggested in this book build on an attempt to encourage selfsufficiency, and, although the current climate would appear to favor
general retrenchment for the program, changes that focus on providing
work incentives may receive substantial support. If the current economic expansion continues, such policies may be perceived as ways to
increase work at the same time they aid a small number of recipients
who are left behind.
Many of the supportive changes made since 1996 were left as state
options, and this has led to an uneven food assistance landscape in
which work and participation among food stamp recipients are better
supported in some states than others. As noted in Chapter 1, even as
participation rates have continued to increase over the past decade, the
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participation gap between eligible individuals who are employed and
those who are not remains large. Policies such as simplified income
reporting and vehicle exemptions, which have been adopted by nearly
all states, should be part of the standard federal program or at least the
default. The adequacy of the maximum household benefit needs to be
carefully considered, and the efficacy—not to mention the morality—of
withholding food assistance from people with no other resources needs
to be scrutinized.

Notes
1. States would most likely want to maintain stricter reporting policies for some
households, such as those on cash assistance and those subject to work rules and
time limits. They also would not want to impose tougher policies for some others,
including those receiving transitional food stamp benefits.
2. States have been slow to publicize the elimination of asset limits, and potential
applicants in many states are routinely given information suggesting that their
assets may preclude SNAP eligibility (Heflin, Mueser, and Cronin 2015).
3. Although the limits are now indexed, they are only allowed to change in $250
increments.
4. Prior to 1996, food stamp benefits were set at 103 percent of the TFP to address
the problem of inflation. However, the PRWORA cut the benefit formula to 100
percent of the TFP.
5. Between 1989 and 2011, Missouri and South Carolina eliminated statewide GA
programs. Georgia eliminated its GA program in the early 1980s.
6. See Falk and Aussenberg (2014) and Aussenberg and Falk (2018).
7. This usage is illustrated by the website “Federal Safety Net,” which identifies
SNAP as the third largest U.S. welfare program, after Medicaid and the Earned
Income Tax Credit (federalsafetynet.com, accessed Sept. 2, 2018). Wikipedia
references the older usage, observing that TANF “is often referred to simply as
‘welfare’.” (en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Temporary_ Assistance_for_Needy_Families,
accessed Sept. 2, 2018).
8. Gunderson (2016) argues that there is little evidence in support of this claim.
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